CNANW 2023 General Members Meeting

October 21, 2023, Ottawa

Saturday October 21, 2023,
Ottawa, Cartier Place Suite Hotel
180 Cooper Street

For room reservations: Email reservations@suitedreams.com 
and cc: robin.cnanw@gmail.com (for special event rate).

Morning CNANW General Members Meeting
8:45 AM sharp –  approx 10:15 AM (hybrid event, link will follow)
(Canadian Pugwash Group AGM runs approx 10:15 – 12:00)


Lunch 12:00 – 1:00

Afternoon Sessions: Joint CNANW and Canadian Pugwash Group Event
Panel Discussion with Q and A: 1:00 – 1:30,  with Tariq Rauf and Paul Meyer
Special Communications Event: 1:30 – 3:30, with invited Global Affairs Canada (TBC) and media guest speakers.

Further details will follow.

For those attending in Ottawa, consider also reserving to see the Canadian Pugwash Group/CIPS event on Friday, October 20 at University of Ottawa:

Security Challenges of Emerging Technologies

Ernie Regehr: Getting ready for the inevitable negotiations on Ukraine

Ernie Regehr is author of Disarming Conflict: Why peace cannot be won on the battlefield (Between the Lines) and co-founder of Project Ploughshares.

He recently moderated an international panel sponsored by the Canadian Pugwash Group, which included Russian and Ukrainian speakers/participants.

This peace table panel followed on from a November 2022 roundtable organized by CNANW.

https://pugwashgroup.ca/getting-ready-for-the-inevitable-negotiations-on-ukraine/

Peace Table for Ukraine and Russia

Canadian Pugwash Group hosted an online peace table panel, as response to a recent CNANW request.

The goal of the Canadian Pugwash Group Peace Table was to fulfill one of the actions recommended during the November 29, 2022 Special Meeting of Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (CNANW):

To reduce the nuclear weapons risks in the Ukraine conflict, “civil society can establish an international forum to coordinate an exchange of views towards a peaceful outcome.”

A report and Food for Thought paper will be available soon.
Currently the panel video is available for viewing here.

Reducing the Nuclear Weapons Risks in the Ukraine Conflict

Report on November 29, 2022 Special Meeting of CNANW

In a recent statement, NATO’s Secretary General, a former social-democratic Norwegian Prime Minster, Mr. Jens Stoltenberg said that the alliance will continue to support Ukraine for “as long as it takes”. He added: “We will not back down.” Prominent columnists have challenged the very idea that a ceasefire in the Ukraine crisis is possible or have even suggested that it might lengthen the war on Russian President Putin’s terms. Some press for a “fight to victory” by Kyiv, given recent gains on the battlefield. Sometimes the nuclear weapons threat is seen as blackmail, a bluff, or a risk worth ignoring.

How then can Canada constructively contribute to peace?

Panelists at the CNANW discussion in late November were asked to consider opportunities for reducing the nuclear weapon threat, and prospects for peace. All acknowledged the dire situation in Ukraine following the illegal Russian invasion.

Negotiations are Not Enough

Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C.
Comments to CNANW, November 29, 2022 in Ottawa

Is peace possible in today’s world? Suppose, by some twist of fate, a sudden ceasefire in the Ukraine war occurred without either Ukraine or Russia being declared a winner; and Russia’s threat to use nuclear weapons stopped; and Canada actually used its diplomatic machinery to become active in helping both Ukraine and Russia to live with the geopolitical contours agreed at the negotiating table. Would the world then be at peace? Unfortunately, the answer is no.

To read full statement:

“Nuclear Threats and Canada’s Disarmament Diplomacy”

Paul Meyer, CIPS/CNWC event,
University of Ottawa, November 28, 2022

Video of event: https://youtu.be/1aFwviz27MY

Paul Meyer speaks at the event

“Nuclear weapons and the existential threat they pose to humanity have assumed a new and disturbing saliency in the last few months. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, accompanied as it is by persistent nuclear “sabre-rattling” and the blatant use of these weapons as instruments of intimidation and coercion has rudely reminded global society that huge arsenals of these weapons of mass destruction remain. But it could be worse.”

Continue reading here:
NuclearThreats and Cdn Diplomacy

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS PROVIDES 60 YEARS OF LESSONS: We face the same risk of escalation and the same possibility of transformation

Robin Collins and Dr. Sylvie Lemieux, CNANW Co-chairpersons

https://www.hilltimes.com/2022/10/13/cuban-missile-crisis-provides-60-years-of-lessons

The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis started because two superpowers, each capable of global annihilation but mis-judging the security expectations of their rivals, called the other’s bluff and moved us all close to nuclear war.

When Soviet Premier Khrushchev and US President Kennedy faced off over Cuba’s decision to host Soviet nuclear missiles, the world was only 17 years’ distance from the mass slaughter of Hiroshima and Nagasaki civilians. Atomic destruction was still palpable, and fear was widespread.  Today, we are more than 75 years removed, and it isn’t clear how many people appreciate the severity of our emergency.

The Cuba crisis ended because sober heads were allowed room to discuss the peaceful route away from Doomsday, with some of that sobriety being in the conflict-resolution efforts of UN Secretary-General U Thant.  Behind-the-scenes deals were engineered. (The US agreed to quietly remove their missiles from Turkey and the USSR theirs from Cuba). The resulting collaboration would benefit both sides, and humankind.

The crisis was so severe and tensions so high that far-reaching efforts were made afterwards to reduce risks even further. Over the next dozen years alone, an array of eight nuclear weapon-related treaties were agreed. Among them was the establishment in 1963 of a direct hot line between Washington and Moscow to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war by mistake or misinterpretation. This was followed by a Limited Test Ban Treaty (late 1963); the cornerstone Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) which is today signed by 191 countries; and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (in 1972). Other treaties would follow.

Today in Europe, 60 years after the Cuba crisis, there is a hot war between Russia and Ukraine but also a proxy war that risks enlargement and escalation. In 1962, while a single American U-2 pilot died during an aerial reconnaissance mission over Cuba,  there were not thousands killed nor cities destroyed, nor occupied regions annexed.

We also know more today about the likely impact of even a small nuclear exchange. According to modelled calculations, a relatively small nuclear weapon exchange could cause dramatic global cooling and result in a “nuclear famine” that would ravage the earth.

Eventually there will have to be peace in Ukraine. Until then, we must focus also on preventing this war from “going nuclear” wherein millions might be endangered in the fallout (and worse.) 

It may seem unlikely in this moment that elimination of all nuclear weapons can be put back on the front policy burner. Threatened use of “tactical” nuclear weapons is ubiquitous in the daily news. Yet, Canada can have a role in the de-escalation of tensions and in the replacement security thinking and diplomacy that urgently need to be put into place.  60 years ago, we saw the quelling of an earth-threatening crisis then lead quickly to major arms control and disarmament opportunities. This is our urgent task now, too.  Canada, get ready to help.


published in The Hill Times, October 13, 2022
referenced in Ceasefire blog, October 14, 2022
linked here as pdf

Roche: The world doesn’t want another Cuban Missile Crisis

Douglas Roche

We are not bereft of key ideas and high-level persons to find creative ways to end the present carnage in Ukraine. The Cuban Missile Crisis ended because John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev took a risk with crisis diplomacy. Can Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin take a similar risk for peace? Canada should push diplomacy, not arms, to end the Ukraine war.

Published in The Hill Times, October 12, 2022

EDMONTON— The possibility of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in the Ukraine war has led to comparisons with the Cuban Missile Crisis 60 years ago this month, in which, for 13 days, humanity stood on the brink of World War III.

The crisis passed because U.S. president John F. Kennedy and Soviet Union president Nikita Khrushchev engaged in crisis diplomacy and negotiated a solution to the problem of the Soviets installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. But negotiations today to end the Ukraine war seem farthest from the minds of the Western leaders and Russian President Vladimir Putin, let alone Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. For Canada’s part, the word “negotiations” does not escape the lips of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau or Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly. The G7, which includes Canada, has just signed on for more weapons to be sent to Ukraine.

I am undoubtedly speaking against a headwind when I call for Canada to support the creation of an international commission, composed of eminent figures, to reach beyond the clamour and hubris engaged in by both the West and Russia to deal with the practical realities of the Ukraine war. The essential reality is to stop the war before it escalates into World War III.

The history of the Cuban Missile Crisis should be a guide. Here is what happened in the momentous days, Oct. 16-29, 1962.

The Cuban crisis arose when the U.S. discovered—on the basis of aerial surveillance photos—that the Soviets were installing nuclear missiles in Cuba.

Kennedy imposed a naval quarantine around Cuba to stop Soviet ships carrying nuclear missiles for further installation. But for some of the president’s advisers, that was not enough: they wanted a full-scale invasion or bombing of Cuba. Kennedy feared such action would launch World War III with both Moscow and Washington using nuclear weapons against each other.

Tensions throughout the world ran sky-high in what was quickly recognized as the greatest atomic bomb threat since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On the eighth day of the crisis, UN Secretary-General U Thant sent an urgent message to Khrushchev and Kennedy, appealing for a moratorium to halt further military action. Suddenly, Kennedy saw a way for the Soviets to stop their shipments without looking like they had capitulated to the U.S. He responded to U Thant and asked him to send a second message to Khrushchev, stating that if the Soviets would hold up shipments, the U.S. “would be glad to get into conversations about how the situation could be adjusted.”

U Thant picked up the signal and sent a second message to both leaders, asking Khrushchev to instruct Soviet vessels to stay away from the quarantine area, and asking Kennedy to instruct U.S. vessels to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships. To both leaders, he stated: “This would permit discussions of the modalities of a possible agreement which could settle the problem peacefully.”

The crisis ended a few days later when Khrushchev agreed to verifiably remove his missiles from Cuba in return for a U.S. non-invasion pledge. There was also a deal, kept secret at the time, in which Kennedy agreed to de-commission aging U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey six months later.

When it was over, the U.S. and Soviet governments sent a letter to U Thant expressing, in diplomatic understatement, “appreciation for your efforts in assisting our governments to avert the serious threat to peace, which recently arose in the Caribbean area.” Kennedy added his own note of praise: “U Thant has put the world deeply in his debt.” Publicly, the Americans took the credit for ending the crisis. U Thant, never a showman, returned to his duties.

Should the 1962 lesson of “crisis diplomacy” be applied today? The answer is yes. And the need is urgent. U.S. President Joe Biden has warned the world could face “Armageddon” if Putin uses a tactical nuclear weapon to try to win the war.

Some argue that a comparison of the Ukraine war to the Cuban Missile Crisis is invalid because it’s too late: Russia has already invaded Ukraine causing horrendous suffering; Ukraine has counter-attacked and Russia has responded with more shelling and deaths. The militarists argue that Russia must be defeated; vengeance must be obtained. This mantra has closed the minds of the West to negotiations. But if the war continues— with or without nuclear weapons—it will soon be NATO vs. Russia, and that will indeed become World War III.

Putin’s military doctrine has always been “escalate to de-escalate.” I think he is actually getting ready to negotiate because he now realizes that NATO, the growing military alliance which he saw as a threat to Russian imperialism, is more strongly determined than ever to stop him.

What is there to negotiate? My colleague Ernie Regehr, author of Disarming Conflict: Why Peace Cannot Be Won on the Battlefield, argues that intensified diplomacy “in pursuit of mutually acceptable security arrangements” is in the interests of both Russia and Ukraine.

Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, has called for a high-level “commission for dialogue and peace,” led by UN Secretary-General António Guterres, Pope Francis, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

We are not bereft of key ideas and high-level persons to find creative ways to end the present carnage. The Cuban Missile Crisis ended because Kennedy and Khrushchev took a risk with crisis diplomacy. Can Biden and Putin take a similar risk for peace? Canada should push diplomacy, not arms, to end the Ukraine war.

Former Senator Douglas Roche is the author of The Human Right to Peace.

The Hill Times

Simpson: Russian-Ukraine war brings nuclear risk to level not seen since Cuban missile crisis

Winter is coming so Russia’s chokehold on European gas, superior tank manoeuvres on snow, and increased mobilization effort foretell a conventional advantage.

The Hill Times, October 10, 2022

The Russian-Ukraine crisis may pose a greater risk of nuclear use than the Cuban missile crisis 60 years ago this month. According to the Ukrainian president’s head office, Andriy Yermak the country’s intelligence agencies believe there is a “very high” risk that Russia might use tactical nuclear weapons. Experts caution that Moscow’s leader is “desperate,” and like a cornered rat, President Vladimir Putin may use nuclear weapons to force the enemy to back down, a part of Russian military doctrine known as escalate to de-escalate.

Last month, Putin’s thinly veiled nuclear threat as he ordered a partial mobilization of 300,000 reservists stated that Russia would “use all the means at our disposal” to defend its territory. But the White House’s warnings have been stark, and U.S. President Joe Biden made it clear at the UN General Assembly that Russia’s threats would be opposed. More recently, he warned the world could face “Armageddon,” assessing the nuclear risk at its highest in 60 years. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in an interview on the sidelines of the assembly, confirmed that the United States sent warnings to Russia to steer clear of nuclear war. Former CIA director and retired four-star army general David Petreus explicitly warned the U.S. and its allies would destroy Russia’s troops and equipment in Ukraine—as well as sink its Black Sea fleet—if the Russian president uses nuclear weapons.

War is folly and assuredly Putin’s inner circle must be questioning the ill-fated decision to attack Kiev to topple Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government. Putin’s attempt to liberate the Donbas region by sheer force, not persuasion, and sham legislation purporting to formally annex four Ukrainian regions—Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia—cannot obscure the reality that Russia’s military does not yet control the war-torn territory and Russia’s reign would be tenuous for generations to come.

Ukrainian troops are retaking more territory in regions illegally annexed by Russia and making breakthroughs in the east and south, recapturing villages and liberating settlements. However, Russian forces struck targets far from the front line last week, purportedly using self-destructing, Iran-supplied drones to hit the city of Bila Tserkva, south of Kiev. The entire Crimean peninsula, annexed in 2014, is also under constant threat due to Ukraine’s sinking of the Russian warship Moskva, the flagship of the Russian Navy’s Black Sea fleet. Russian submarines might not be able to safely harbor there and might have to be redeployed to the Arctic and Baltic Sea.

Winter is coming so Russia’s chokehold on European gas, superior tank manoeuvres on snow, and increased mobilization effort foretell a conventional advantage. However, Ukraine will receive even more sophisticated weapons, in part because the horror of discovering mass graves and tortured Ukrainian bodies lessens the United States’ reluctance to ratchet up the conflict by filling Ukraine’s war chest with billions of dollars of military aid.

Forebodingly, Putin’s speeches are replete with references to the neo-Nazis and the neo-Nazi coup-appointed regime in Ukraine. The leader’s preoccupation with defending the motherland from “Western pseudo-values” may signal a return in his mind to the Siege of Leningrad, where he was born and over a million died. How to defy and reassure a paranoid, violent man who holds all the levers of power and is neither subject to democracy nor beholden to others in his inner cabal?

History is replete with evidence that men fear knives borne by men within the inner circle who stab the strongest in the back. As Thomas Hobbes warns, “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest by secret machination or confederacy.” The account of the Last Supper in the King James Bible highlights Jesus’s disciple Judas’s betrayal of him. Former U.S. president Donald Trump was betrayed by close aides, from Steve Bannon to his daughter Ivanka. There are legions of legendary stories of betrayal because, in their pursuit of power, leaders cast aside sycophants who become marginalized, secret enemies.

Irrational, vengeful followers may fully support decisions by autocratic men, like Putin, North Korea’s Kim Jong-Un, or Trump to use nuclear weapons. But the nuclear taboo has become much stronger since the Cuban missile crisis because so much more is known about the effects of nuclear winter, even from the use of 50 tactical nuclear weapons, merely 0.3 per cent of the world’s arsenal. Russian doctrine allows local commanders to use tactical nuclear weapons to stave off defeat, or loss of Russian territory. But if Russia crosses the line, Jake Sullivan, the U.S. national security adviser to the White House disclosed the United States will respond decisively.

China’s Xi Jinping and India’s Narendra Modi are preaching caution to Putin directly, not mincing their words. At the same time, opposition is growing in Russian cities and remote villages in far-flung regions to mobilizing untrained men to become more cannon fodder. Putin’s recent claim that the United States created a precedent for the use of nuclear weapons with its bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 seemed to imply that if the West continues to support Kyiv and send weapons to Ukraine, he could resort to the nuclear option.

As each day passes, the nuclear threats Putin has made, veiled in self-pity and grandiosity, make the threat of an above-ground demonstration shot of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine’s east more credible. Putin’s aggressive threats lower the threshold for nuclear use and increase the risk of nuclear conflict and global catastrophe. The likelihood of nuclear use today may be more—or less—than it was back in late February, but unlikely events happen all the time. Nuclear threats are bluffs—until the catastrophic day they are not.

Nevertheless, the norm of non-use can act as a powerful restraint on leaders, just as it did in 1962 during the executive committee’s decision-making process in the United States. Once the Cuban missile crisis ended, significant steps that led to nuclear disarmament were taken, including the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. If this crisis ends safely, frightened world leaders will need to strongly promote stability, peace, and security.

Erika Simpson is a professor of international politics at Western University, the president of the Canadian Peace Research Association, and the co-author of How to De-escalate Dangerous Nuclear Weapons and Force Deployments in Europe.

On: “NWC Reset: Frameworks for a nuclear-weapon-free world”

Brief comments at the NPT side panels
(by Robin Collins, Co-chair, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons)
August 9, 2022 by Zoom

“Don’t let your reticence with one approach for the sake of alliance solidarity be the excuse of convenience that you use to justify not proceeding with another.

A colleague in Canada recently asked us to imagine that day when “You wake up to the news that the last remaining warhead has been dismantled. The era of nuclear weapons is over.”

We know he wasn’t being overly optimistic, because he then offered a list of many of the hard cases and sticky problems that obstruct us: the nuclear sharing policies of NATO; North Korea; Iran; the nuclear weapons states outside the NPT, and all those NPT obligations and expectations that to a large extent are unfulfilled or are openly violated. 

He was urging us to be realists and to consider the complementarity of options.

The point is that the specific vehicle must defer to the desire and commitment by states to accomplish the abolition. What will inspire the political will to end the existential threat hanging over us all? What are the unnecessary obstacles?

As nuclear weapon abolitionists we can make the project of abolition and the replacement security framework coherent and as palatable as possible so that when the road is cleared, or clearer, things can as easily as possible fall into place. Which package, or options picked, is far less important. What counts is that the goal is pursued in earnest.

As Jackie Cabasso, one of our Abolition 2000 working group members said earlier at the NPT as an NGO representative — considering the ignoring of NPT commitments from 1995, 2000 and 2010, it’s time to refocus our attention on the nuclear-armed states. A time-bound target for abolition is overdue. Jackie said: we “call on the nuclear-armed and nuclear sharing states to commit to a timeframe of no later than 2030 for the adoption of a framework, package of agreements or comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, and no later than 2045 for full implementation”.

The Nuclear Weapon Convention Reset paper that our Abolition 2000 working group constructed, has this approach, which is to highlight the three primary options that are under consideration: Then it is up to the official and unofficial Nuclear Weapon States, NATO members and NATO umbrella states to proceed.

Proceed swiftly. 

Canada, my country, has no nuclear weapons although was involved in the nuclear bomb project from the early days, and is a member of NATO, along with three nuclear-armed states, five others with nuclear-sharing arrangements[i] and seven others that participate in Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics (known as SNOWCAT).[ii] 

We are fully aware of the pressures on NATO members towards their being compliant and in solidarity with other NATO members, to go along with the prevailing winds – and therefore also the reluctance to push back or be that nuclear nag (once again). This is still the case, particularly in the most delicate of moments, by which I mean the current context of the Russian illegal invasion of Ukraine: the sabre-rattling rhetoric, the references to actual use of nuclear weapons. Not to mention the daily killing and dying. But just as the New START talks need to continue, now more than ever, so is this a good time for states to speed up, not slow down, progress on abolition.

Countries like Canada may have been involved at the Stockholm Initiative, a diplomatic forum that proposes risk reduction measures and a “stepping stones approach” to nuclear disarmament; or attended The Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons this last June, but then avoided the TPNW like the plague, despite pressure from disarmament activists and many parliamentarians.

We are here pragmatically advocating for nuclear weapon states and NATO members to consider the options for disarmament that you can stomach. If not the TPNW with protocols, then a nuclear weapons convention or a framework of instruments. Don’t let your reticence with one approach for the sake of alliance solidarity be the excuse of convenience that you use to justify not proceeding with another. 

Some leader or leaders need to step up within NATO to break the silence and expose the illusory consensus, and begin the renewal of the abolition project, because, as the UN Secretary-General said, “Luck is no strategy!”

Our “Nuclear Weapons Convention Reset: Frameworks for a nuclear-weapon-free world” message, therefore, highlights this complementarity of three possibilities towards a time-bound abolition target, for de-escalation of the unhelpful rhetoric, for urgent risk reduction measures, and ultimately for a sustainable peace and common security wherein nuclear threats and nuclear weapons no longer exist. 

Thank you for your time.


[i] Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey

[ii] Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland and Romania

CNANW: CANADA CAN DO MORE AT THE NPT Review Conference

[version française ci-dessous en pièce jointe]
A version of this commentary also appeared in The Hill Times on July 27, 2022

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force in 1970 and is designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of nuclear disarmament. It is supported by 191 states, but not four unofficial nuclear-armed countries: India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan, nor South Sudan.

The Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (CNANW) recognizes the positive steps Canada has made towards the aims of the NPT, but there is much more to do. There is global urgency now as a result of war in Ukraine, but also an opportunity to push forward our shared disarmament and non-proliferation objectives at the NPT Review Conference this August.

Canada did attend The Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in June, but no officials attended the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) first meeting of states parties, even as observers, despite strong efforts from the Canadian disarmament community and several parliamentarians advocating for Canada to show up. 

Canada did attend the five ministerial meetings of the “Stockholm Initiative”, a diplomatic forum that proposes risk reduction measures and a “stepping stones approach” to nuclear disarmament, but the government chose not to be represented at the ministerial level, a gesture that would have increased Canada’s visibility.

At the Madrid NATO Summit in June, Canada failed to speak out against the NATO consensus that the military and political organization will “remain a nuclear alliance while nuclear weapons remain”, a mantra that logically makes nuclear weapons more permanent, not easier to eliminate in keeping with NATO’s goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Indeed, nuclear weapons will continue to be a global threat while NATO persists in being a nuclear-armed alliance. 

After two years of delay due to the COVID pandemic, the NPT review conference is being held in New York in August. Divisions have worsened between nuclear weapon possessing states and those allies supporting NATO nuclear deterrence policy on one hand, and states supporting the TPNW on the other. Given global obstacles and the heightened risks of expanded war, including nuclear war, as a result of the conflict in Ukraine, Canada needs to demonstrate leadership at the Review Conference in these areas:

Encourage complementarity through respectful references to the TPNW, and by seeking to engage rather than alienate TPNW supporters in furtherance of NPT goals. Similarly, support civil society initiatives, such as Abolition 2000’s effort (Frameworks for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World) to broaden the options available towards abolition, whether it be a nuclear weapons convention; a framework of instruments; or the TPNW, bolstered by protocols or related instruments. 

Constructive language: Advocate for firm language denouncing threats, explicit or implicit, of nuclear weapon use. But avoid rhetoric that undermines diplomatic progress or possibilities for conflict resolution.

Call for renewed diplomatic efforts to deal urgently with the outstanding proliferation issues of North Korea and Iran.

Promote greater transparency through the common reporting formats that Canada has championed, and which can provide for fact-based judgments on the progress of NPT parties in meeting nonproliferation and disarmament obligations.

Support operationally significant nuclear risk reduction measures such as de-alerting deployed ICBMs and adopting a No First Use policy.  Advocate as well against increases in nuclear missile inventories, or any expansion of nuclear weapon use scenarios. Press also for multilateral and bilateral nuclear force reduction talks among the five nuclear weapon states in keeping with their existing NPT obligations.

CNANW encourages Canada to embrace these leadership opportunities that will also reflect the wishes of the vast majority of Canadians who support nuclear disarmament.

Steering Committee of the
Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Robin Collins and Dr. Sylvie Lemieux (Co-Chairs)
Dr. Nancy Covington
Beverley Delong
Dr. Richard Denton
Dr. Jonathan Down
Cesar Jaramillo
Dr. Arnd Jurgensen
Dr. Erika Simpson

July 26, 2022

Peter Langille: The future requires far deeper cooperation, sustainable common security

Insecurity is spreading. Another hot war in the Ukraine, a climate emergency, another Cold War and nuclear arms race, another long war just announced, 100 million people displaced by conflict and climate change, vast inequality and precarious conditions everywhere. Our new global neighbourhood looks rough and risky.

Whatever happened to security, “the state of being free from danger or threat”?

Petition to the Government of Canada: Attend, as an observer, the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Pétition au gouvernement du Canada: Assister, en tant qu’observateur, à la première réunion des États parties au Traité sur l’interdiction des armes nucléaires

[Note that a paper version of this petition has collected the requisite 25 signatures.]

[Notez qu’une version papier de cette pétition a recueilli les 25 signatures requises.]

We the undersigned citizens and residents of Canada, profoundly concerned about the increasing risk to humanity posed by nuclear weapons and mindful of the leadership role Canada has historically played on arms control, call upon Canada to Join our allies, Germany and Norway, in attending the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW as an observer.

Nous, soussigné.e.s, citoyen.ne.s et résident.e.s du Canada, profondément préoccupé.e.s par le risque croissant que représentent les armes nucléaires pour l’humanité et conscient.e.s du rôle de leader que le Canada a historiquement joué en matière de contrôle des armements, appelons le Canada à se joindre à nos alliés, l’Allemagne et la Norvège, pour assister à la première réunion des États parties à la TIAN en tant qu’observateur.

CNANW Appeal to Members of Canada’s Parliament to Support Canada attending as Observer to the TPNW

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24 together with prolonged conflict and heightened rhetoric have contributed to fears of a widening of this war, and even to detonation of nuclear weapons by intention, through escalation or by accident.

Add to this global challenge the US and Russian withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019, the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran, ongoing skirmishes between India and Pakistan, modernization of nuclear weapons by all nuclear weapon states, and the possibility of cyber-attacks leading to a nuclear weapon event.

One opportunity now arises through a show of support by Canada for movement in a safer direction and towards eliminating nuclear weapons from the battlefield entirely, as part of our country’s longstanding disarmament legacy.

The First Meeting of States Parties of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) approaches at the end of June. Several countries that have shown little interest in signing the TPNW are still considering registering their solidarity in support of the intent of the treaty’s goal of nuclear weapon abolition. This includes NATO allies Norway and Germany, and aspiring NATO members Sweden and Finland. Canada can join this group.

For these reasons, we ask all Members of Parliament to now support an all-party call on the Canadian government to attend the TPNW inaugural meeting of states parties – as an observer.

Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
May 31, 2022

RCAAN: Appel aux membres du Parlement canadien pour soutenir la participation du Canada en tant qu’observateur à la TIAN

L’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie le 24 février ainsi que la prolongation du conflit et l’intensification de la rhétorique ont contribué à faire craindre un élargissement de cette guerre, voire une détonation d’armes nucléaires par intention, par escalade ou par accident.

À ce défi mondial s’ajoutent le retrait des États-Unis et de la Russie du traité sur les forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire (FNI) en 2019, le retrait des États-Unis de l’accord nucléaire avec l’Iran, les escarmouches en cours entre l’Inde et le Pakistan, la modernisation des armes nucléaires par tous les États dotés d’armes nucléaires et la possibilité de cyberattaques menant à un événement impliquant des armes nucléaires.

Dans le cadre de l’héritage de longue date de notre pays en matière de désarmement, une occasion se présente aujourd’hui d’aller dans une direction plus sûre et d’éliminer complètement les armes nucléaires du champ de bataille.

La première réunion des États parties au Traité sur l’interdiction des armes nucléaires (TIAN) approche à la fin du mois de juin. Plusieurs pays qui ont manifesté peu d’intérêt pour la signature du TIAN envisagent encore d’enregistrer leur solidarité pour soutenir l’objectif du traité, à savoir l’abolition des armes nucléaires. Il s’agit notamment des alliés de l’OTAN, la Norvège et l’Allemagne, et des pays aspirant à devenir membres de l’OTAN, la Suède et la Finlande. Le Canada peut se joindre à ce groupe.

Pour ces raisons, nous demandons à tous les membres du Parlement de soutenir l’appel lancé par tous les partis au gouvernement canadien pour qu’il assiste à la réunion inaugurale des États parties au TIAN – en tant qu’observateur.

Le Réseau canadien pour l’abolition des armes nucléaires
31 mai 2022

END ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON THREATS

Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons statement
on Ukraine and nuclear weapon threats
METTRE FIN À TOUTES LES MENACES D’ARMES NUCLÉAIRES,
en français ci-dessous

CNANW condemns the raised readiness level of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear forces to what was described as a “special regime of combat duty.” This followed Russian President Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and was a clear warning to NATO not to intervene in the war. Heightened rhetoric by Putin also included a threat that any interference by other states in Ukraine would result in consequences “such as you have never seen in your entire history.”

Belarus, Russia’s ally in the conflict, has stated that it will abandon its status as a non-nuclear weapon state and will now consider hosting Russian nuclear missiles. 

While the United States indicated it was not responding in-kind and therefore not raising the alert status of its own nuclear arsenal, NATO made clear that any Russian aggression beyond Ukraine into the territory of an alliance member would provoke an immediate response. The risk of escalation to a regional war, including nuclear war, is real and concerning. 

Unfortunately, in late March, US President Biden stepped away from his own previously stated support for a sole purpose (no first use) policy for the American nuclear arsenal. Instead, its “fundamental” role will be to deter nuclear attacks. This ambiguity leaves open options to use nuclear weapons for wider purposes. 

President Putin’s statement is the first public threat of threatened nuclear weapon use during an ongoing military conflict in recent memory. The rise in global risk is unacceptable. The grave humanitarian consequences of even a small nuclear exchange provide no legal, ethical or militarily useful justification for the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons.

Therefore, CNANW calls on the Canadian government to make crystal clear Canada’s long-held opposition to nuclear weapons threats or use, and to contribute to the reduction of rhetoric that could lead to escalation of the current conflict in Ukraine. 

April 28, 2022

METTRE FIN À TOUTES LES MENACES D’ARMES NUCLÉAIRES
Déclaration du Réseau Canadien pour l’Abolition des Armes Nucléaires sur l’Ukraine et les menaces liées aux armes nucléaires

Le RCAAN condamne l’augmentation du niveau de préparation des forces nucléaires stratégiques de la Fédération de Russie à ce qui a été décrit comme un “régime spécial de service de combat”. Cette décision fait suite à l’invasion illégale de l’Ukraine par le président russe Poutine et constitue un avertissement clair à l’OTAN de ne pas intervenir dans cette guerre. Poutine a également menacé, dans sa rhétorique, que toute ingérence d’autres États en Ukraine aurait des conséquences “telles que vous n’en avez jamais vues dans toute votre histoire”.

Le Belarus, allié de la Russie dans le conflit, a déclaré qu’il abandonnerait son statut d’État non doté d’armes nucléaires et envisagerait désormais d’accueillir des missiles nucléaires russes.

Si les États-Unis ont indiqué qu’ils ne répondaient pas en nature et ne relevaient donc pas le niveau d’alerte de leur propre arsenal nucléaire, l’OTAN a clairement indiqué que toute agression russe au-delà de l’Ukraine sur le territoire d’un membre de l’alliance provoquerait une réponse immédiate. Le risque d’escalade vers une guerre régionale, y compris une guerre nucléaire, est réel et préoccupant.

Malheureusement, à la fin du mois de mars, le président américain Biden s’est éloigné de son soutien, précédemment déclaré, à une politique de l’arsenal nucléaire américain à but unique (pas de première utilisation). Au lieu de cela, son rôle “fondamental” sera de dissuader les attaques nucléaires. Cette ambiguïté laisse ouverte la possibilité d’utiliser les armes nucléaires à des fins plus larges.

De mémoire récente, la déclaration du président Poutine est la première menace publique d’utilisation d’une arme nucléaire pendant un conflit militaire. L’augmentation du risque mondial est inacceptable. Les graves conséquences humanitaires d’un échange nucléaire, même minime, ne fournissent aucune justification légale, éthique ou militairement utile pour l’utilisation ou la menace d’utilisation d’armes nucléaires.

Par conséquent, le RCAAN demande au gouvernement canadien d’exprimer clairement l’opposition de longue date du Canada aux menaces ou à l’utilisation d’armes nucléaires, et de contribuer à la réduction de la rhétorique qui pourrait mener à une escalade du conflit actuel en Ukraine.

28 avril 2022

Putin Shows Why Possesion Must be Outlawed Now

by Douglas Roche

It’s no longer postponable. Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown, in a demented and terrifying way, why the possession of nuclear weapons must be outlawed now. Far from closing down the little that remains of nuclear disarmament agreements because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this seminal moment in the history of the 21st century must be seized.

The contradictions in Canada’s nuclear disarmament policies have got to be fixed. Sand castles won’t stop a tsunami. We and our NATO partners can no longer go on professing a desire for an end to nuclear weapons while supporting the military doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which leads to even more than the present 13,000 nuclear weapons…

To read on, see pdf below.

Canadians call on NATO:  Reduce Nuclear Risks

Les Canadien.ne.s demandent à l’OTAN de Réduire les Risques Nucléaires

In June 2022, NATO will conclude a review of its principal “Strategic Concept” policy. Backed by strong science-based information, we urge the Canadian Government to lessen the risk of nuclear weapon use, and emphasize diplomacy in resolving conflicts.

En juin 2022, l’OTAN conclura la révision de sa politique principale relative au “concept stratégique”. Sur la base d’informations scientifiques solides, nous demandons instamment au gouvernement canadien de réduire le risque d’utilisation de l’arme nucléaire et de privilégier la diplomatie pour résoudre les conflits.