what did the World Hearth Organization say about nuclear weapons?

What did the World Hearth Organization say about nuclear weapons?
World Health Organization, 1987
NUCLEAR WAR

After a nuclear war “famine and diseases would be widespread; social, communication, and economic systems around the world would be disrupted…It is obvious that the health services in the world could not alleviate the situation in any significant way.”

Press Release WHO/69 – 12 September 1995
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING

Speaking today at the Forty-sixth session of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Regional Committee for the Western Pacific in Manila, the Philippines, Dr Hiroshi Nakajima, WHO Director-General, addressed the issue of testing of nuclear weapons.

“Within the framework of the United Nations, WHO has consistently supported nuclear disarmament, the non-proliferation treaty, and the nuclear test ban treaty currently under negotiation”, said Dr Nakajima. “WHO is firmly opposed to the production, testing, stockpiling, transport or use of nuclear weapons. This position is implicit in the WHO Constitution which opposes any common danger or risk to the attainment of Health for All. WHO has carried out extensive studies on the effects of nuclear war on health and health services, as well as the health effects of nuclear accidents particularly at Chernobyl. At the request of the World Health Assembly (Resolution WHA46.40 of 14 May 1993) and the UN General Assembly (Resolution 49/75K of 15 December 1994), the question of the lawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons has been referred by WHO and the UN to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, where the matter will be before the Court in November this year”.

It is evident that besides the immediate catastrophic effects in terms of death, casualties and material damage, the use of nuclear weapons will cause long term human suffering and environmental disturbance beyond our capacity to accurately predict. As WHO stated some ten years ago, “the only approach to the treatment of the health effects of nuclear explosions is primary prevention of such explosions, that is the prevention of atomic war”.

In 1991, a WHO Management Group* noted that “with the positive changes in the world situation it was the peacetime uses of atomic energy that had become the greater cause for concern”. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons are still being produced, tested and stockpiled; therefore the potential danger of the consequences of their use has not yet been eliminated, and there are significant costs and dangers associated with their transport, testing and disposal.

Although most of the information concerning the health and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons comes from the two bombings that took place in 1945, other investigations are under way based on retrospective analysis as well as simulation of nuclear tests underground and in the atmosphere. We know that nuclear detonation produces three major sources of death and injury: blast, heat wave and release of radiation. Exposure to instantaneous radiation (gamma rays and neutrons) causes sickness and, possibly, death. At relatively low doses, it damages blood cells. At higher doses, damage occurs to the gastrointestinal tract, and at very high doses injury to the brain. Suppression of the body’s immune system is recognized as a consequence of radiation over-exposure.

Long-term effects such as cancer induction and genetic damage result from instantaneous radiation exposure during the explosion and the longer-term contamination of the environment. Long-term psychological effects continue to be noted among the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

An account of the health effects of nuclear weapons must also include consideration of the production cycle of these weapons including mining and production of materials, fuel enrichment, development, manufacture, testing, stockpiling, maintenance, transport, dismantling, storage and disposal. Each of these stages presents direct risks to the health of the personnel involved and the general population. The costs of safe disposal often exceed those of development.

At least 1950 nuclear tests have been carried out since 1945. Testing can be carried out in space, in the air, on the earth’s surface or under water (all called “atmospheric”), or underground, the latter being the only method used at the present time. To date, it is reported that approximately 1420 underground tests have been conducted in different parts of the world. Simulation technology for nuclear explosions has been developed to such an extent that renewed tests for more advanced weapons would be totally unnecessary if the simulation technology were shared among states.

Resumption or continuation of underground tests is of particular concern especially in the case of “shallow” tests. Not only does this entail the risk of instantaneous leaks of short-lived and long-lived radioisotopes to the ground, to water and air, but it may trigger potential long-term effects that are not immediately apparent. Changes to the structural integrity of the ground, temperature and stress are likely to increase the number and size of crevices in the surrounding rock or ground. Such crevices would provide paths for long- term exchanges with the surroundings, in particular ground water, rivers and oceans, in ways that are difficult to predict.

Isotopes likely to dominate long-term radioactivity are Caesium-137, Strontium-90, Plutonium -239 and Americium-241. Furthermore, Caesium-137 and Strontium-90 are known to be transported by water and remain in the food- chain. As for Plutonium-239 and Americium-241, their most significant potential exposure route is by inhalation. In addition to the possible release of these radionuclides, radioisotopes from previous tests which had already settled or lodged in the rock are feared to be freed by the new tests.

“In short, there is no such thing as a “fail-safe” nuclear weapon testing, and we cannot be assured that testing will be without risk to present and future generations. The best way to ensure human health and peace, is for all nations of the world to share knowledge about nuclear energy, and to forswear the production, testing and use of nuclear weapons. The World Health Organization, and I as its Director-General, stand for a “nuclear-weapons-free world. Greater transparency on the part of nuclear powers would certainly help”, said Dr Nakajima.

For further information, please contact Valery Abramov, Health Communications and Public Relations, WHO, Geneva. Tel (41 22) 791 2543. Fax (41 22) 791 4858.
___________________________________

* Established by the Director-General in 1983 to follow up Resolution WHA 36.28 “Effects of nuclear war on health and health services”. The Group consists of six international experts appointed by the Director-General.

See also:
a) Radiation Effects Research Foundation
b) Japan Confederation of A and H Bomb Survivors (Hidankyo)
c) Physical effects of a nuclear weapon blast (FAS) 
 

Conventionally-Armed UK Trident?

CONVENTIONALLY-ARMED UK TRIDENT? By Commander Robert Green, Royal Navy (Retired)*

Doubts about Nuclear Deterrence

The recent US nuclear posture review was partly prompted by growing doubts about the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence against the current primary threat – extremists armed with weapons of mass destruction. These doubts surfaced during the Gulf War, when Israel was subjected to nearly 40 Iraqi Scud missile attacks, for which it was known a chemical warhead had been developed. Lack of a proportionate response has led several US nuclear weapon experts to argue that deterrence through threatened use of precisely targeted conventional munitions, rather than nuclear weapons, would be more credible and preferable in most cases. For neutralising deeply buried targets, however, the head of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos National Laboratory has recommended that the US should develop a new generation of “small” nuclear weapons.

George W. Bush is the first US President to have publicly expressed lack of faith in nuclear deterrence against extremists, linking this to his emphasis on reviving ballistic missile defence. What is more, both his Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Colin Powell rejected use of nuclear weapons against Iraqi forces in the Gulf War, which means that any future comparable US nuclear threat would lack credibility.

“Small” Nuclear Weapons No Answer

Those pressing for so-called “small” nuclear weapons to be used against deeply buried targets need to be aware of the following drawbacks:

• In tests, the currently operational US B61-11 nuclear weapon penetrated only 20 feet into dry earth.
• Deeper penetration is impossible because the weapon casing cannot be made strong enough to withstand the impact and temperatures involved.
• Low-yield warheads are too sensitive to the massive shock.
• The heavy radioactive fallout cannot be contained.
• In addition, even the smallest nuclear weapon has such excessive explosive power that, when combined with its unique long-term poisoning effects from radioactive fallout, it would inevitably breach international humanitarian law on proportionality and discrimination.

The irresponsibility of calling for such a role for nuclear weapons was highlighted in 1998, when General Lee Butler, Commander-in-Chief US Strategic Command in charge of all strategic nuclear weapons from 1992-94, warned: “In a single act, we would martyr our enemies, alienate our friends, give comfort to the non-declared nuclear states and impetus to states who seek such weapons covertly.” Experience in Afghanistan has shown that the US has a growing choice of precision-guided conventional munitions, some of which are capable of disabling targets formerly thought vulnerable only to nuclear attack. However, the enormously indiscriminate “daisy cutter” fuel-air munitions, and those using depleted uranium, probably violate international humanitarian law.

US Navy Converting Trident to Conventional Armament

The START II Treaty limits US and Russian nuclear-armed ballistic missile-firing submarine (SSBN) forces to 14 hulls each – so the US will have to decommission four of its 18 Ohio class Trident-equipped submarines. Irrespective of this, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wants to accelerate US Navy plans to start work in October 2003 on a $2 billion project to convert the first two of them to carry a formidable mix of conventional armament as attack submarines (SSGNs). The 24 Trident missile launch tubes will be altered to accept canisters carrying seven Tomahawk cruise missiles, fitted with a variety of conventional warheads. With a full cruise missile conversion, each submarine will be able to launch up to 154 cruise missiles, compared with 24 such missiles in current US SSGNs. An alternative configuration allows for 66 special forces to access two midget submarines to carry out covert shallow water and amphibious operations. These are each attached to the SSGN’s deck over two launch tubes. The remaining tubes will be shared between special forces equipment stowage and cruise missile canisters, still enabling some 98 Tomahawks to be carried.

US Concerns About UK Trident

Ever since the US allowed the UK to acquire Polaris, Trident’s predecessor system, in 1962, it has had understandable concerns about the complications for its own nuclear strategy. Kennedy’s Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, condemned small nuclear forces as “dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence and lacking in credibility as a deterrent.” The limitations of trying to encapsulate a credible capability in one system have become more apparent with Trident now the sole delivery system for the UK nuclear arsenal. For example, the UK government felt the need to claim an added sub-strategic capability by a “degree of flexibility in the choice of yield for the warheads on its Trident missiles.” Apparently this has been achieved by fitting a single, lower yield warhead in some of the 16 missiles carried by the four Vanguard class SSBNs.

Bearing in mind that sub-strategic nuclear weapons would be the first and most likely ones to be used, there is a risk that use of a UK Trident missile would be misidentified as a US Trident launch. Also, there is no way of distinguishing between sub-strategic and strategic use. NATO’s announcement in 1999 that “a small number of United Kingdom Trident warheads” were part of NATO’s sub-strategic posture in Europe, therefore, was unconvincing. With British attack submarines now equipped with conventionally-armed cruise missiles, this would be a much more proportionate and lawful way to launch a sub-strategic strike.

UK Trident and Nuremberg

The current UK government is widely acknowledged as the most constructive among the nuclear weapon states. In the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, it unilaterally cut its nuclear arsenal by a third – at 200 warheads, now the smallest of the five recognised nuclear states – and announced that it had relaxed Trident’s notice to fire from “minutes” to “days”. It was credited with a key role in negotiating the May 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review final document incorporating a plan of action on disarmament measures, by interceding with the other nuclear states and non-nuclear NATO member states.

However, the UK government is under pressure from the Trident Ploughshares non-violent direct action campaign, which is exposing the illegality of the current deployment of the single UK SSBN on so-called “deterrent” patrol. Citing the 1996 World Court Advisory Opinion on the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the campaign has achieved sensational acquittals in jury trials of activists in both Scotland and England. The Court confirmed that any threat, let alone use, of nuclear weapons would generally violate international humanitarian law, of which the Nuremberg Principles are part. This has serious implications for all those involved in planning and deploying nuclear forces because, unlike hired killers or terrorists, military professionals and their political leaders must be seen to act within the law.

The campaign is gaining support among legislators and church leaders, particularly in Scotland where the UK Trident force is based. As with the campaigns to ban slavery, and now landmines, and to establish an International Criminal Court, it is drawing upon a deep and growing awareness that it is on the right side of morality, commonsense, the law and public opinion. The basic legal argument is as follows:

• Use of UK Trident nuclear weapons would be illegal, because the explosive power of each warhead (about 100 kilotons, equivalent to roughly eight times that of the weapon which devastated Hiroshima) plus radioactive effects make them incapable of use without violating international humanitarian law.
• In its Advisory Opinion the World Court stated: “If the envisaged use of force is itself unlawful, the stated readiness to use it would be a threat prohibited under Article 2, paragraph 4 [of the UN Charter].” The UN Charter is applicable at all times.
• UK Trident is deployed under a policy of “stated readiness to use”, in order that nuclear deterrence is credible.
• Nuremberg Principle VI states: “The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law: (a) Crimes against peace: (i) Planning, preparation… of a war… in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; (ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i); (b) War crimes… (c) Crimes against humanity…”

Probably for the first time, the Nuremberg Principles are being brought to bear on the Royal Navy, which obviously does not want to be accused of crimes against peace and humanity, let alone war crimes. Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham observed: “I suspect we are all going to find international law, as it applies to conflict, a harsh taskmaster.” Yet the UK government prides itself as the only permanent member of the UN Security Council to recognise the World Court’s jurisdiction, and wishes to be seen to uphold international law and democracy as leader of the 54-member Commonwealth.

The Royal Navy’s leaders must be increasingly disturbed and frustrated by the legal challenge to Trident, and – especially after 11 September 2001 – by the reality that the weapon system of four of its most prestigious and costly “capital ships” is currently impotent in responding to the most serious and intractable threat.

Implications for UK Trident

All this has serious implications for the UK’s four new SSBNs. Some former Royal Navy colleagues have indicated to the author that they would support getting rid of the nuclear weapons “provided that a conventional role is found for the submarines”. However, in the latest edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships, Editor Captain Richard Sharpe RN (Ret’d) reported: “The UK government has said it has no plans to deploy conventional warheads in Trident.”

With the increasing cost of high-technology warships, the Royal Navy is steadily shrinking. As it learned the hard way in the Falklands War, the vulnerability of surface ships to missile attack is extremely expensive and difficult to counter, and ever-quieter submarines can now deliver them from stand-off range. If it wants to sustain a capability for rapid, substantive military reaction with global reach, it cannot afford to ignore the option of converting UK Trident to conventional armament – especially as the research, development and production of the modular systems are being done by the US, and their availability looks compatible with the deadline for the decision on whether to replace UK Trident. For the variety of reasons covered above, the US would probably welcome such a development in the US-UK special relationship.

A New World Role for the UK?

That decision apparently has to be taken by around 2007. This will offer the opportunity to renounce nuclear weapons, and replace them with a more credible, practical and lawful conventional deterrence system, which the US Navy is developing anyway – and which the US Defense Secretary, impressed by the performance of its SSGNs in countering terrorism, is raising to a top priority. With four conventionally-armed, multi-role Vanguard class SSGNs, the Royal Navy’s submarine service – diverted since the Polaris era into the essentially political power game of nuclear deterrence – would be able to focus fully on what it does best: “precision engagement” to prevail in the three key military objectives: deterrence, coercion and combat.

For maximum kudos, the UK government should announce this step at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. The first “breakout” by one of the five recognised nuclear states – and permanent members of the UN Security Council – would be sensational, and would transform the nuclear disarmament debate overnight. The UK would gain a major new world role which would be enormously popular, with its Prime Minister an immediate candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. In NATO, with Lord Robertson as Secretary General, the UK would wield unprecedented influence in leading the drive for a non-nuclear strategy – which must happen if NATO is to sustain its cohesion. It would create new openings for applying pressure, particularly to the US and France, and heavily influencing India, Israel and Pakistan, and others intent on obtaining nuclear weapons. Moreover, it would open the way for a major reassessment by Russia and China of their nuclear strategies, for all nuclear forces to be de-alerted, and for multilateral negotiations to start on a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Wider Implications

Both the anti-nuclear movement and Trident advocates have to confront difficult and challenging questions. Acquisition by the five recognised nuclear states of their nuclear arsenals involved probably the greatest investment in financial, political and human terms since the Second World War. Short of a detonation of a modern nuclear weapon in a populated area, none of these states is likely to be prepared to risk breaking out of the nuclear club without finding a replacement system with clear advantages to balance the perceived loss of security. Conversion of its SSBNs to conventional, multi-role armament offers such a system for the UK. France, Russia and China would probably try to copy the US and UK, because the SSGN would come into its own as one of the most potent, yet invulnerable, maritime coercion platforms. Meanwhile, the longer those who prefer to cling to the illusions of nuclear deterrence do so, the more likely it becomes that undeterrable extremists will follow their irresponsible example and obtain nuclear weapons.

Conclusion

Nuclear-armed Trident missiles in the Royal Navy’s Vanguard class SSBNs are a major impediment to the UK’s ability to contribute to deployment of rapid reaction forces in support of the US, because they are militarily useless; and anyway their use – and therefore any threat to use them – would be unlawful.

A confluence of developments in the US, driven by a loss of faith in nuclear deterrence against the most serious threat of extremists armed with weapons of mass destruction, points to a “win-win” solution for the Royal Navy, the US-UK special relationship, and the worldwide anti-nuclear movement. Exploiting US plans for some of its Ohio class Trident-armed submarines, a UK decision to convert its four Vanguard class submarines to carry a mix of precision-guided conventional armaments and special forces would restore the Royal Navy’s eroding position as a leading maritime force equipped to work alongside the US Navy, and would probably be encouraged by the US. In so doing, the UK government would gain huge kudos as the first recognised nuclear state to break out from reliance on nuclear weapons for its security, and would position itself to take a leading role in the struggle to secure an enforceable global treaty with a verifiable plan to eliminate nuclear weapons.


*Commander Robert Green navigated Buccaneer nuclear strike aircraft and anti-submarine helicopters before serving in Fleet Intelligence during 20 years in the Royal Navy 1962-82. He is now a consultant on alternative security thinking based in Christchurch, New Zealand. http://www.disarmsecure.org

NOTES
1. See Robert W. Nelson, “Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons”, The Journal of the Federation of American Scientists, January/February 2001, Volume 54, Number 1, http://www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v541/weapons.htm
2. Walter Pincus, “Nuclear Expert Challenges U.S. Thinking on Warheads”, Washington Post, 24 October 2000.
3. Speech at National Defense University, 1 May 2001.
4. Colin Powell, A Soldier’s Way (Hutchinson, London, 1995), p324.
5. Nelson (2001).
6. General Lee Butler, “A Voice of Reason”, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1998, p61.
7. Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8 August 2001, p3. Update on Rumsfeld in “$20 Billion Budget Rise Is Urged”, International Herald Tribune, 8 January 2002.
8. John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence (Oxford University Press), 1995), pp300-301.
9. ‘Sub-Strategic Use of Trident’, letter from C.H.J.Davies, UK Ministry of Defence, to Dr E. Waterston, 27 October 1998.
10. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion of July 8), UN Document A/51/218 (1996), http://www.icj-cij.org reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 809 & 1343 (1996).
11. Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham KCB , “The Apotheosis of 21st Century Warfare”, RUSI Journal, December 2000, pp64-68.
12. Jane’s Fighting Ships 2000-2001, p748.

An agreed process for disarmament

An agreed process for disarmament

All global citizens should be concerned that nuclear weapons are found, secured, disarmed and the components monitored or destroyed. This is a rough guide to the elements of the process which is required.

a) Declarations – statements will be made by states describing the warheads, delivery systems, materials, equipment, and facilities they control which are associated with nuclear weapons.

b) End launch-on-warning posture for all nuclear weapons.

c) De-alerting of all warheads worldwide- taking steps to make it more difficult to use nuclear weapons rapidly, such as removing warheads from missiles and storing them a distance away, or covering a silo with dirt.

d) Safe storage of and accounting for fissile materials – this occurs today in 36 non-nuclear weapons states who have all their fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) under the regular inspection and controls of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

e) Securing all warheads so they cannot be stolen.

f) Tagging each warheads can be tagged with unique identified for each warhead or container. They cannot be altered without the tampering being revealed. This allows for accurate accounting records.

g) Sealing the warheads or their containers to stop the substitution of fake warheads or other objects for the original contents.

h) Monitoring the storage through the use of sensors or video monitoring to ensure the storage facility is not entered.

i) Safe transport — occurs regularly in today’s world

j) Authenticating the warheads when they are presented for dismantling to confirm that the warhead or component is what it is declared to be — and not a fake.

k) Establishing a chain of custody of fissile materials and other components through to an agreed final disposition state.

Listserve

CNANW has two lists you can subscribe to: a full version which forwards to your email address all nuclear abolition messages submitted, and a “lite” version which circulates a reduced volume of email.

To subscribe to the full version of “abolition”, send an email message to majordomo@watserv1.uwaterloo.ca with <subscribe abolition> (no brackets) as the content of your message.

By sending <unsubscribe abolition> you can get off the list at any time.

For abolitionlite, send the message <subscribe abolitionlite> to:
majordomo@clifford.uwaterloo.ca.

By sending <unsubscribe abolitionlite> you can get off the list at any time.

Has the use of nuclear weapons been threatened?

Has the use of nuclear weapons been threatened?
Yes, here are a few examples in history of such threats:

NUCLEAR WEAPON CRISES 1946 – 1985

Incident Year Length of Crisis Threat By Weapons Held by US Weapons Held by USSR
IRAN I 1946 One day USA 40 0
YUGOSLAVIA 1946 One day USA 40 0
BERLIN 1 1948 15 months USA 120 0
KOREA 1950 36 months USA 400 ?
VIETNAM 1 1954 3 months USA 1200 ?
CHINA 1 1954 8 months USA 1200 ?
SUEZ 1956 7 days USSR/USA 2100 60
CHINA 2 1958 2 months USA 3000 110
BERLIN 2 1959 4 months USA 3200 175
BERLIN 3 1961 4 months USA 3600 240
CUBA 1962 2 weeks USSR/USA 3900 300
VIETNAM 2 1969 3 months USA 4000 1400
JORDAN 1970 2 weeks USA 4000 1800
ISRAEL 1973 19 days USA 6800 2200
IRAN 2 1980 6 months USA 10312 6846

Source:  David Morgan, VANA

Does your group want to endorse the statement?

Does your group want to endorse the statement for abolition of nuclear weapons?
Group Statement of Support for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons

Groups endorsing the following statement are endorsing the goal of the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. We are grateful for your moral support.

We believe that the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons are abhorrent and morally wrong. We call on the Government of Canada to work urgently with other nations to conclude a convention which will set out a binding timetable for the abolition of all nuclear weapons in the world.

Name of Group:

Name of Contact Person:

Address:

Phone:

Fax:

Email Address:

Email your endorsement to cnanw@web.ca

Tips for Meeting Politicians

Tips for Meeting Politicians
Once you feel you have enough information about nuclear weapons, you and your group may decide to try and meet with your Member of Parliament (MP) or a local Senator. If so, here are some tips that may be helpful.

• First, do some research on the person you are meeting. The Parliamentary website (http://www.parl.gc.ca) is an excellent source of information about MPs, Senators, Parliamentary committees etc.
• The following URL takes you right to an alphabetical list of MPs. Click on the letter of your MP’s surname, and it will take you to a short political biography of your member. This will be useful in tailoring your questions to your MP’s interests and parliamentary responsibilities. http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/about/people/house/mpscur.asp
•You can also search by constituency.
• The biography will tell you if your MP is on the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, or the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. If so, you may want to find our what the Committee is currently discussing. This is also available from the Parliamentary website, under “committee business”.

• In preparation to meet your MP, you should:
• Decide who will go to the meeting. (A group of 2-4 people is a good size, but a larger group is OK too.)
• Decide on the main points you want to make, the questions you want to ask, and what you’d like the politician to do. Try and anticipate some follow-up to the meeting, so you have a reason to contact the office again.
• Assign responsibility among your group for who will speak to which points, and who will ask which questions.
• Consider taking visual material to the meeting.
• Consider putting together a small folder of good information to leave with the MP. It could include a description of who you are, and accurate background information about the issues you will talk about. Even if MPs don’t have time to read it, their assistants may.
• Be on time for the meeting. Even better, be a few minutes early! And don’t overstay your welcome.

• Once you know what you want to talk about, e-mail or phone the MP’s Constituency office and request a meeting. Half an hour to an hour is about as much time as you can expect to get.
• MPs’ e-mail addresses almost all follow a formula. It is: the first five letters of their last name, followed by their first initial @parl.gc.ca. Thus Mary Anderson would be anderm@parl.gc.ca.
• If you can’t find the local phone number, the House of Commons information service (613 992-4793) can give you phone and fax contacts for all MPs in their Ottawa offices, and in their constituencies.

• Offer to send additional material, to follow up points of particular interest to the MP.
• You might also consider inviting your MP to public meetings or seminars your are holding, as a way of making them aware of community concerns about nuclear weapons. Even if they can’t attend, they will know the meetings are taking place.

Abolition Resolution

Abolition Resolution
Whereas there are over 30,000 nuclear weapons (of which 4,400 are on hair trigger alert) posing an immediate threat to the world due to the risk of their accidental or intentional use;

Whereas billions of dollars are being spent annually on nuclear weapons which could be used to address human needs around the globe;

Whereas some 61 international Generals and Admirals from 17 countries advised in December 1996 that long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons;

Whereas the International Court of Justice determined in July 1996 that the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons is, for all practical purposes, contrary to international law; and that all states are obligated to conclude an agreement for the elimination of nuclear weapons;

Whereas the NATO states in their policy statements continue to refer to nuclear weapons as being “essential to preserve peace”;

Whereas there are no ongoing multilateral negotiations ongoing for an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons;

Whereas a model Nuclear Weapons Convention has been filed before the UN General Assembly as a discussion document to encourage progress toward a Convention;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT ____________________________
A) call upon the Government of Canada to:

ï conform with international law and make clear in the United Nations and in NATO Canada’s strong moral, political and financial commitment to urgent negotiations for the total elimination of nuclear weapons;

ï urge that all nuclear weapons on hair trigger alert be de-alerted immediately and move to de-activate systematically all other nuclear weapons to reduce the risk of unintentional nuclear war;

ï support public education in Canada and abroad concerning the urgency of a ban on nuclear weapons, as it did during the negotiations for a ban on landmines.

B) advise the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the requests contained within this Petition.

THEREFORE BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that ____________________encourage its members to study and speak out to family, friends and neighbours about the urgency of the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Church Resolution – National Missile Defence

Church Resolution – National Missile Defence
Resolution – National Missile Defence

Whereas we believe that we are stewards of the creation and that Canada must therefore comply with its legal obligation to negotiate an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons as such weapons threaten all of creation;

Whereas we believe that international security will be enhanced best through political and economic cooperation, reassurance and nuclear arms reductions rather than by threats;

Whereas the Missile Defence program of the US plans to intercept incoming missiles at a cost likely exceeding $100 billion (US), with the cost for Canadian participation remaining unknown;

Whereas the interceptors can be easily overcome by the use of decoys, chaff or other inexpensive methods or, alternatively, that states may simply use other methods of delivering weapons such as ships or trucks;

Whereas the interception of missiles would result in radioactive materials falling to earth and the creation of debris in space which would hinder both use of satellites and future space travel;

Whereas all states are obligated by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“NPT”) to engage in a process of disarmament;

Whereas planning the use of interceptors will encourage other states to increase their nuclear arsenals to overcome the interceptors, thus encouraging the spread of nucler weapons in breach of the NPT;

Whereas the Outer Space Treaty states that “Outer Space…shall be free for exploration and use by all States” and that “Outer Space…is not subject to national appropriation …by means of use or occupation..”

Whereas the long term plan (“Vision 2020″) for the US Space Command anticipates the US developing an “ability..to deny others the use of space” and “global surveillance with the potential for a space-based global precision strike capability” with space becoming another “medium of warfare” in breach of the Outer Space Treaty;

It is hereby resolved by _____________________ that the Government of Canada should be strongly encouraged to:
1. Strongly oppose the American proposal for Missile Defence and object to the US Space Command’s proposed “Vision for 2020″;
2. Study options for a multilateral system for monitoring missile launches;
3. Call for the negotiation of a ban on military missile flight launches;
4. Call for the negotiation of a ban on all weapons in space; and
5. Proceed urgently to support the negotiation of an international agreement for the elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide.

Steps to Abolition

How do we go about getting rid of nuclear weapons?

  1. A legal obligation to ban nuclear weapons
  2. An agreement to ban testing
  3. An agreement to eliminate nuclear explosive materials
  4. Nuclear weapons free zones
  5. Reductions in nuclear warheads
  6. An agreed process for disarmament
  7. No cheating
  8. Negotiation of an agreement among all states which:
    • defines the process for eliminating nuclear weapons
    • prohibits further development, stockpiling, use and threat of use


  9. Do you want more information?

No cheating?

How can we be sure that nuclear explosive materials aren’t secretly being produced or delivery systems being readied for use? We need a combination of technological devices and monitoring (and whistleblowing where necessary) by citizens.

The bulk of the technology is known. The US and Russia already have abided by agreements requiring declarations, safe storage, monitoring, and dismantling of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. To see the technology used, check the website for the Center for Cooperative Monitoring: http://www.cmc.sandia.gov

What do we need for further progress?

No backtracking! We need legally binding promises for reductions from all nuclear weapons states and the reductions must not be reversible. 187 states agreed in May 2000 that the “‘Principle of Irreversibility’ should apply to nuclear disarmament, …arms control and reduction measures”.

Transparency is key – what reductions are made must be seen to be made by other states. All global citizens have their security at risk due to their weapons….

Verification is a mechanism or procedure that seeks to determine whether a party is abiding by or fulfilling its obligations under a given agreement, and verification measures are designed to detect those who violate their obligations. The essential basis of verification is a formal commitment by parties to engage, or not to engage, in certain activities.

Here are some of the terms used to describe the technical steps used by states to verify:

    1. Surveillance techniques for items subject to verification can include use of fixed and mobile monitors including:
      • radiation sensors
      • CCTV (closed circuit TV)
      • time lapse photography movement sensors
      • tamper-indicating devices and seals.
        Source: Ministry of Defence (UK) Summary of AWE Study.
    2. Perimeter-portal monitoring at dismantling facilities refers to the capability of verifying that weapons enter an area for dismantling and do not leave except as tagged components.
      Source: Steve Fetter, “Future Directions in Nuclear Arms Control and Verification”, INESAP Information Bulletin No. 15, at p. 50, at p. 52.
      See further discussion in Steve Fetter, “Verifying Nuclear Disarmament”, Henry L. Stimson Center Occasional Paper No. 29, October 1996, p. 11 – 13.
    3. National Technical Means (NTS) – carried out without the active cooperation of the state under inspection and may include satellites, seismic sensors, radar systems, intelligence service activities and collection and processing of information via government departments.
    4. Onsite Inspections – usually by international inspectors of two types:
      • Routine inspections – onsite inspections assume a willingness to coperate and intervene more fundamentally in the sovereignty of states. Routine inspections allow inspectors to carry out controls at predefined times and at previously agreed locations on a state territory.
      • Challenge inspections- used to look into specific indications for non-compliance. They would be more intrusive than routine controls since the state under inspection would have problems adapting to them, if it really did want to hide something.
    5. Technical data analysis/ data processing
    6. Whistleblowing – a person passes on information regarding banned activities to the appropriate recipient.
      Source: Annette Schaper and Katja Frank, A Nuclear Weapon Free World – Can it be Verified?
      Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, PRIF Report No. 53, at p.
    7. Environmental monitoring technologies refers to:
      • continuous monitoring around sites
      • monitoring during on site inspections
      • locating covert plants involved in the nuclear weapons cycle
      • provide data as part of dismantlement verification process.

      Source: Ministry of Defence (UK) Summary of AWE Study (pdf file). (AWE)

    8. Non-destructive assessment techniques to verify dismantlement process include;
      • gamma-ray spectrometry
      • neutron measurements.
        They are used to verify the existence and number of warheads, provide vital information much more quickly, cheaply and safely than through other methods. They maintain the secrecy of design information.Source: Ministry of Defence (UK) Summary of Atomic Weapons Establishment Aldermaston (AWE) Study.

An agreement to eliminate nuclear explosive materials

An agreement to eliminate nuclear explosive materials
The two main fissile materials used in nuclear weapons are Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). For details on where these materials can be found, including current inventories, please refer to the Power Point program created by Dr. Annette Schaper of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt. Her data is based on the text Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium: 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies by David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker.

Governments worldwide have proposed that the Ambassadors meeting within the Conference on Disarmament should start negotiations on a Fissile Missile Control Treaty. Two points of contention have arisen.

First, some nuclear weapons states want controls to be only on future production, not current stockpiles.

Second, China believes that it cannot participate in such a Treaty if the US intends to build a missile defence system. The Chinese governments thinks that if the US has the capability of defending against China’s 20 ICBMs, that China will need to build more nuclear weapons. Because of this, they may need more fissile material and thus they won’t sign such a Treaty.

For details on progress toward an FMCT, please check these sites:

Federation of American Scientists: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/fmct/index.html
Acronym Institute (UK): http://www.acronym.org
Reaching Critical Will (operated by WILPF in New York): http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org

Reductions in nuclear warheads

Reductions in nuclear warheads

Have reductions in nuclear arsenals occurred?
YES:
Total warheads in 1986: 69,480
Total in 1996: 37,000
Total in 2001: 21,840

How have these occurred?
Most have been negotiated under bilateral agreements such as:
The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Agreement , “INF Treaty” (1987)
START I
START II

For more information on proposed agreements see:
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/index.html

What is a nuclear warhead? What is fissile material?

What is a nuclear warhead? What is fissile material?
The atomic bomb relies on fission for its power. “Nuclear fission is the splitting of the nuclei of heavy atoms such as uranium or plutonium.”

The thermonuclear bomb relies on fusion.  “Nuclear fusion is the combination of light atoms such as hydrogen isotopes.”

“In both processes part of the mass of these elements is converted into energy and, if this can be made to happen fast enough, a nuclear explosion is the result.”

(Source for the above: Christy Campbell, Nuclear Facts, Methuen, Toronto, 1984.)

A “warhead” is the explosive part of a nuclear weapons system.  “Warheads consist of nuclear materials, conventional high explosives, related firing mechanisms and containment structure” (as defined within the model Nuclear Weapons Convention).

“Fissile Material” are elements in which the nuclei may be split either spontaneously or with the bombardment of neutrons of low energy.

“Fissionable Material” are elements in which the nuclei may be split either spontaneously or with the bombardment of neutrons regardless of the energy of the neutron, and includes fissile material.

See additional definitions in the model nuclear weapons convention document.

If these weapons enrage you, you are not alone!

If these weapons enrage you, you are not alone!
Excerpt from “The End of Imagination” by Arundhati Roy
published on Saturday August 1, 1998 in The Guardian (UK); also posted at: http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/imagination.html

“Who the hell is the prime minister to decide whose finger will be on the nuclear button that could turn everything we love — our earth, our skies, our mountains, our plains, our rivers, our cities and villages — to ash in an instant? Who the hell is he to reassure us that there will be no accidents? How does  he know? Why should we trust him? What has he ever done to make us trust him? What have any of them ever done to make us trust them?

The nuclear bomb is the most anti-democratic, anti-national, anti-human, outright evil thing that man has ever made.

If you are religious, then remember that this bomb is Man’s challenge to God. It’s worded quite simply: We have the power to destroy everything that You have created.

If you’re not religious, then look at it this way. This world of ours is four thousand, six hundred million years old.
It could end in an afternoon.”


Sixty-one International Generals and Admirals have spoken out calling for long-term international nuclear policy being based on the elimination of nuclear weapons:

Statement by Generals and Admirals of the World Against Nuclear Weapons
December 5, 1996

We, military professionals, who have devoted our lives to the national security of our countries and our peoples, are convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever present threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitute a peril to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect.

Through our variety of responsibilities and experiences with weapons and wars in the armed forces of any nations, we have acquired an intimate and perhaps unique knowledge of the present security and insecurity of our countries and peoples.

We know that nuclear weapons, though never used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, represent a clear and present danger to the very existence of humanity.

There was an immense risk of a superpower holocaust during the Cold War. At least once, civilization was on the very brink of catastrophic tragedy. That threat has now receded, but not forever — unless nuclear weapons are eliminated.

The end of the Cold War created conditions favorable to nuclear disarmament. Termination of military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Unite States made it possible to reduce strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and to eliminate intermediate range missiles.

It was a significant milestone on the path to nuclear disarmament when Belarus, Kazakhastan and Ukraine relinquished their nuclear weapons.

Indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the UN General Assembly in 1996 are also important steps towards a nuclear-free world. We commend the work that has been done to achieve these results.

Unfortunately, in spite of these positive steps, true nuclear disarmament has not been achieved. Treaties provide that only delivery systems, not nuclear warheads, will be destroyed. This permits the United States and Russia to keep their warheads in reserve storage, thus creating a “reversible nuclear potential.”

However, in the post-Cold War security environment, the most commonly postulated nuclear threats are not susceptible to deterrence or are simply not credible. We believe, therefore, that business as usual is not an acceptable way for the world to proceed in nuclear matters.

It is our deep conviction that the following is urgently needed and must be undertaken now:

First, present and planned stockpiles of nuclear weapons are exceedingly large and should now be greatly cut back;

Second, remaining nuclear weapons should be gradually and transparently taken off alert, and their readiness substantially reduced both in nuclear weapons states and in de facto nuclear weapons states;

Third, long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.

The United States and Russia should — without any reduction in their military security — carry forward the reduction process already launched by START — they should cut down to 1000 to 1500 warheads each and possibly lower.

The other three nuclear states and the thee threshold states should be drawn into the reduction process as still deeper reductions are negotiated down to the level of hundreds. There is nothing incompatible between defense by individual countries of their territorial integrity and progress toward nuclear abolition.

The exact circumstances and conditions that will make it possible to proceed, finally, to abolition cannot now be foreseen or prescribed.

One obvious prerequisite would be a worldwide program or surveillance and inspection, including measures to account for and control inventories of nuclear weapons materials. This will ensure that no rogues or terrorists could undertake a surreptitious effort to acquire nuclear capacities without detection at an early stage.

An agreed procedure for forcible international intervention and interruption of covert efforts in a certain and timely fashion is essential.

The creation of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world, confidence-building and transparency measures in the general field of defense, strict implementation of all treaties in the area of disarmament and arms control, and mutual assistance in the process of disarmament are also important in helping to bring about a nuclear-free world.

The development of regional systems of collective security, including practical measures for cooperation, partnership, interaction and communication are essential for local stability and security.

The extent to which the existence of nuclear weapons and fear of their use may have deterred war — in a world that in this year alone has seen 30 military conflicts raging — cannot be determined.

It is clear, however, that nations now possessing nuclear weapons will not relinquish them until they are convinced that more reliable and less dangerous means of providing for their security are in place.

It is also clear, as a consequence, that the nuclear powers will not now agree to a fixed timetable for the achievement of abolition.

It is similarly clear that, among the nations not now possessing nuclear weapons, there are some that will not forever forswear their acquisition and deployment unless they, too, are provided means of security. Nor will they forego acquisition it the present nuclear powers seek to retain everlastingly their nuclear monopoly.

Movement toward abolition must be a responsibility shared primarily by the declared nuclear weapons states — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, by the de facto nuclear states, India, Israel and Pakistan; and by major non-nuclear powers such as Germany and Japan. All nations should move in concert toward the same goal.

We have been presented with a challenge of the highest possible historic importance: the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free world. The end of the Cold War makes it possible.

The dangers of proliferation, terrorism, and new nuclear arms race render it necessary. We must not fail to seize our opportunity. There is no alternative.

Signed,

CANADA

Johnson, Major General Leonard V., (Ret.)
Commandant, National Defense College

DENMARK

Kristensen, Lt. General Gunnar (Ret.)
former Chief of Defense Staff

FRANCE

Sanguinetti, Admiral Antoine (Ret.)
former Chief of Staff, French Fleet

GHANA

Erskine, General Emmanuel (Ret.)
former Commander in Chief and former Chief of Staff, UNTSO (Middle East),
Commander UMFI (Lebanon)

GREECE

Capellos, Lt. General Richard (Ret.)
former Corps Commander
Konstantinides, Major General Kostas (Ret.) former Chief of Staff, Army Signals

INDIA

Rikhye, Major General Indar Jit (Ret.)
former military advisor to UN Secretary Generals
Dag Hammerskjold and U Thant
Surt, Air Marshal N. C. (Ret.)
 

JAPAN

Sakoijo, Vice Admiral Naotoshi (Ret.)
Sr. Advisor, Research Institute for Peace and Security
Shikata, Lt. General Toshiyuki (Ret.)
Sr. Advisor Research Institue for Peace and Security
 

JORDAN

Ajelilat, Major General Sahfiq (Ret.)
Vice President Military Affairs, Muta University
Shiyyab, Major General Mohammed K. (Ret.)
former Deputy Commander, Royal Jordanian Air force
 

NETHERLANDS

van der Graaf, Henry J. (Ret.)
Director Centre Arms Control & Verification,
Member, United National Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters

NORWAY

Breivik, Roy, Vice Admiral Roy (Ret.)
former Representative to NATO,
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

PAKISTAN

Malik, Major General Ihusun ul Haq (Ret.)
Commandant Joint Services Committee

PORTUGAL

Gomes, Marshal Francisco da Costa (Ret.)
former Commander in Chief, Army,
former President of Portugal

RUSSIA

Belous, General Vladimir (Ret.)
Department Chief, Dzerzhinsky Militay Academy
Garecy, Army General Makhmut (Ret.)
former Deputy Chief, USSR Armed Forces General Staff

Gromov, General Boris, (Ret.)
Vice Chair, Duma International Affairs Committee,
former Commander of 40th Soviet Army in Afghanistan
former Deputy Minister, Foreign Ministry, Russia

Koltounov, Major General Victor (Ret.)
former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces

Larinov, Major General Valentin (Ret.)
Professor, General Staff Academy

Lebed, Major General Alexander (Ret.)
former Secretary of the Security Coucil

Lebedev, Major General Youri V. (Ret.)
former Deputy Chief Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces

Makarevsky, Major General Vadim (Ret.)
Deputy Chief, Komibyshev Engineering Academy

Medvedev, Lt. General Vladimir (Ret.)
Chief, Center of Nuclear Threat Reduction

Mikhailov, Colonel General Gregory (Ret.)
former Deputy Chief, Deparment of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces

Nozhin, Major General Eugeny (Ret.)
former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces

Rokhlin, Lt. General Lev, (Ret.)
Chair, Duma Defense Committee,
former Commander Russian 4th Army Corps

Sleport, Lt. General Ivn (Ret.)
former Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces

Simonyan, Major General Rair (Ret.)
Head of Chair, General Staff Academy

Surikov, General Boris T.,(Ret.)
former Chief Specialist, Defense Ministry

Teherov, Colonel General Nikolay (Ret.)
former Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces

Vinogradov, Lt. General Michael S. (Ret.)
former Deputy Chief, Operational Strategic Center, USSR General Staff

Zoubkov, Rear Admiral Radiy (Ret.)
Chief, Navigation, USSR Navy
 

SRI LANKA

Karumaratne, Major General Upali A. (Ret.)
Silva, Major General C.A.M.M. (Ret.)
USF, U.S.A. WC (Sri Lanka)
 

TANZANIA

Lupogo, Major General H.C. (Ret.)
former Chief Inspector General, Tanzania Armed Forces

UNITED KINGDOM

Beach, General Sir Hugh (Ret.)
Member U.K. Security Commission
Carver, Field Marshal Lord Michael (Ret.)
Commander in Chief of East British Army (1967-1969),
Chief of General Staff (1971-1973),
Chief of Defense Staff (1973-1976)

Harbottle, Brigadier Michael (Ret.)
former Chief of Staff, UN Peacekeeping Force, Cyprus

Mackie, Air Commodore Alistair (Ret.)
former Director, Air Staff Briefing
 

UNITED STATES

Becton, Lt. General Julius (USA) (Ret.)
Burns, Maj. General William F. (USA) (Ret.)
JCS Representative, INF Negotiations (1981-88)
Special Envoy to Russia for Nuclear Dismantlmement (1992-93)

Carroll, Jr., Rear Admiral Eugene J. (USN) (Ret.)
Deputy Director, Center for Defense Information

Cushman, Lt. General John H. (USA) (Ret.)
Commander, I Corps (ROK/US) Group (Korea) (1976-78)

Galvin, General John R.,
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (1987-1992)

Gayler, Admiral Noel (USN) (Ret.)
former Commander, Pacific

Horner, General Charles A. (USAF) (Ret.)
Commander, Coalition Air Forces, Desert Storm (1991)
former Commander, U.S. Space Command

James, Rear Admiral Robert G. (USNR) (Ret.)

O’Meara, General Andrew (USA) (Ret.),
former Commander U.S. Army , Europe

Pursley, Lt. General Robert E. USAF (Ret.)

Read, Vice Admiral William L. (USN) (Ret.)
former Commander, U.S. Navy Surface Force, Atlantic Command

Rogers, General Bernard W. (USA) (Ret.)
former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army;
former NATO Supreme Allied Commander (1979-1987)

Seignious, II, Lt. General George M. (USA) (Ret.)
fomer Director Army Control and Disarmament Agency

Shanahan, Vice Admiral John J. (USN) (Ret.)
Director, Center for Defense Information

Smith, General William Y., (USAF) (Ret.)
former Deputy Commander, U.S. Command, Europe

Wilson, Vice Admiral James B. (USN) (Ret.)
former Polaris Submarine Captain


Head to CNANW’s action steps!
 

Voices: General Lee Butler’s Address to Canadian Peaceworkers

General Lee Butler’s Address to Canadian Peaceworkers
Ottawa, March 11, 1999

A Round Table was hosted in the Department of Foreign Affairs by the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development and the Canadian Network Against Nuclear Weapons to allow presentations by Gen. Butler, Mr. Robert McNamara (former U.S. Secretary of Defence) and Ambassador Tom Graham (former Presidential Advisor on Arms Control).

General Butler is a 1962 graduate of the US Air Force Academy. He attended the University of Paris as an Olmsted Scholar where he attained a master’s degree in international affairs. His military career included a wide range of flying and staff positions. He attained the rank of General in 1991. In this capacity he served as the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command and subsequently Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. In this capacity, General Butler had the responsibility for all US Air Force and U.S. Navy strategic nuclear forces which support the national security objective of strategic defense. Over his career, he served in numerous policy positions in the Pentagon, his last one as the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The following are the opening remarks by Gen. Butler:

Let me begin by simply expressing my appreciation to those of you in the room who have labored in this vineyard for so many years, most I suspect, simply understanding intuitively what took years for those of us, presumably experts in this business, to appreciate.

And that is, that at the heart of the matter, nuclear weapons are the enemy of humanity. Indeed, they’re not weapons at all. They’re some species of biological time bombs whose effects transcend time and space, poisoning the earth and its inhabitants for generations to come.

So for those of you in the NGO community, I tell you right at the onset, that I personally take heed and encouragement from what you have done so assiduously all these years. I say in the same breath that for most of my life, certainly my years in uniform, I’d never heard of NGOs, and now I suppose I am one!

I think in that regard that I would begin by recalling a comment from what I understand was a Reform Party member at the hearing yesterday, who observed at the outset of his comments (a bit acerbic I might add, but that’s okay, we tend to be a lightning rod for that kind of view): “Say, weren’t you and McNamara two of those folks who used to advocate all this business, deterrence, etc?” I think Bob would join me in saying that we’re guilty as charged, if the charge is that we now consider it our responsibility to reflect, free from the emotional cauldron of the Cold War, and with greater access to the principals and the archives of that period. Guilty of the responsibility to reappraise our positions and certainly guilty of a keen sense of obligation to understand and to expound upon the lessons that we draw from that experience.

I recall the words of a wonderful American novelist of the Deep South, Flannery O’Connor, who once put this delicious line in the mouth of one her characters. “You should know the truth and the truth shall make you odd.” And in deference to our interlocutor yesterday, yes it can certainly appear odd. I appreciate that and that is why I am infinitely patient with people who are either surprised, shocked, or in some cases outraged that someone like myself or perhaps like Bob McNamara now express views that in an earlier part of our life we might have seen as antithetical.

But truth, in my own case, took me almost 40 years to grasp. What I now see as the truth of the nuclear era as I understand it in retrospect. It required 30 years simply to reach the point in my career where I had the responsibilities and most importantly, the access to information and the exposure to activities and operations that profoundly deepened my grasp of what this business of nuclear capability is all about.

What I have come to believe is that much of what I took on faith was either wrong, enormously simplistic, extraordinarily fragile, or simply morally intolerable. What I have come to believe is that the amassing of nuclear capability to the level of such grotesque excess as we witnessed between the United States and the Soviet Union over the period of the 50 years of the Cold War, was as much a product of fear, and ignorance and greed, and ego and power, and turf and dollars, as it was about the seemingly elegant theories of deterrence.

Let me just take a moment and give you some sense of what it means to be the Commander of Strategic Nuclear Forces, the land and sea-based missiles and aircraft that would deliver nuclear warheads over great distances. First, I had the responsibility for the day-to-day operation, discipline, training, of tens of thousands of crew members, the systems that they operated and the warheads those systems were designed to deliver. Some ten thousand strategic nuclear warheads. I came to appreciate in a way that I had never thought, even when I commanded individual units like B52 bombers, the enormity of the day-to-day risks that comes from multiple manipulations, maintenance and operational movement of those weapons. I read deeply into the history of the incidents and the accidents of the nuclear age as they had been recorded in the United States. I am only beginning to understand that history in the former Soviet Union, and it is more chilling than anything you can imagine. Much of that is not publicly known, although it is now publicly available.

Missiles that blew up in their silos and ejected their nuclear warheads outside of the confines of the silo. B52 aircraft that collided with tankers and scattered nuclear weapons across the coast and into the offshore seas of Spain. A B52 bomber with nuclear weapons aboard that crashed in North Carolina, and on investigation it was discovered that one of those weapons, 6 of the 7 safety devices that prevent a nuclear explosion had failed as a result of the crash. There are dozens of such incidents. Nuclear missile-laden submarines that experienced catastrophic accidents and now lie at the bottom of the ocean.

I was also a principal nuclear advisor to the President of the United States. What that required of me was to be prepared on a moment’s notice, day or night, 7 days a week, 365 days a year to be within three rings of my telephone and to respond to this question from the President: “General, the nation is under nuclear attack. I must decide in minutes how to respond. What is your recommendation with regard to the nature of our reply?”

In the 36 months that I was a principal nuclear advisor to the President, I participated every month in an exercise known as a missile threat conference. Virtually without exception, that threat conference began with a scenario which encompassed one, then several, dozens, then hundreds and finally thousands of inbound thermonuclear warheads to the United States. By the time that attack was assessed, characterized and sufficient information available with some certainty in appreciation of the circumstance, at most he had 12 minutes to make that decision. 12 minutes. For a decision, which coupled with that of whatever person half a world away who may have initiated such an attack, held at risk not only the survival of the antagonists, but the fate of mankind in its entirety. The prospect of some 20,000 thermonuclear warheads being exploded within a period of several hours. Sad to say, the poised practitioners of the nuclear art never understood the holistic consequences of such an attack, nor do they today. I never appreciated that until I came to grips with my third responsibility, which was for the nuclear war plan of the United States.

Even at the late date of January 1991, when the Cold War had already been declared over with the signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty in Paris in December of 1990, when I went downstairs on my first day in office to meet my war planners in the bowels of my headquarters. I finally for the first time in 30 years was allowed full access to the war plan. Even having some sense of what it encompassed, I was shocked to see that in fact it was defined by 12,500 targets in the former Warsaw Pact to be attacked by some 10,000 nuclear weapons, virtually simultaneously in the worst of circumstances, which is what we always assumed.

I made it my business to examine in some detail every single one of those targets. I doubt that that had ever been done by anyone, because the war plan was divided up into sections and each section was the responsibility of some different group of people. My staff was aghast when I told them I intended to look at every single target individually. My rationale was very simple. If there had been only one target, surely I would have to know every conceivable detail about it, why it was selected, what kind of weapon would strike it, what the consequences would be. My point was simply this: Why should I feel in any way less responsible simply because there was a large number of targets. I wanted to look at every one.

At the conclusion of that exercise I finally came to understand the true meaning of MAD, Mutually Assured Destruction. With the possible exception of the Soviet nuclear war plan, this was the single most absurd and irresponsible document I had ever reviewed in my life. I was sufficiently outraged that as my examination proceeded, I alerted my superiors in Washington about my concerns, and the shortest version of all of that is, having come to the end of a three decade journey, I came to fully appreciate the truth that now makes me seem so odd. And that is: we escaped the Cold War without a nuclear holocaust by some combination of skill, luck and divine intervention, and I suspect the latter in greatest proportion.

The saving grace was that truly the Cold War was ending at this very moment and therefore I was faced with a decision of great personal consequence. Now having fully to appreciate the magnitude of our nuclear capability and what it implied, when joined in an unholy alliance with its Soviet counterpart, what was I to do? Awaiting in my inbox were $40 billion of new strategic nuclear weapons modernization programs, wanting only my signature. What should be our goals for the next rounds of arms control negotiations? How hard should I fight to maintain the budget of strategic forces, to keep bases open in the face of base closure commissions? And what to do with the nuclear war plan in all of its excess? My conclusion was very simple, that I of all people had the responsibility to be at the forefront of the effort to begin to close the nuclear age. That mankind, having been spared a nuclear holocaust, had now as its principle priority to begin to walk back the nuclear cat, to learn the lessons of the nuclear dimensions of the Cold War, in the interest that others might never go down that path again.

The substance is that I withdrew my support for every single one of those $40 billion of nuclear weapons programs and they were all cancelled. I urged the acceleration of the START I accords and that Minuteman 2 be taken out of the inventory at an accelerated pace. I recommended that for the first time in 30 years bombers be taken off alert. The President approved these recommendations and on the 25th of September 1991, I said in my command center and with my red telephone I gave the orders to my bomber troops to stand down from alert. I put 24 of my 36 bases on the closure list. I cut the number of targets in the nuclear war plan by 75%, and ultimately I recommended the disestablishment of Strategic Air Command, which the President also approved. I took down that flag on the first of June 1992.

As you can imagine, I went into retirement exactly five years ago with a sense of profound relief and gratitude. Relief that the most acute dangers of the Cold War were coming to a close, and gratitude that I had been given the opportunity to play some small role in eliminating those dangers. You can also imagine, then, my growing dismay, alarm and finally horror that in a relatively brief period of time, this extraordinary momentum, this unprecedented opportunity began to slow, that a process I call the creeping re-rationalization of nuclear weapons began, that the bureaucracy began to work its way. The French resumed nuclear testing, the START 2 treaty was paralyzed in the US Senate for three years and now in the Duma for three more. The precious window of opportunity began to close, and now today we find ourselves in the almost unbelievable circumstance in which United States nuclear weapons policy is still very much that of 1984, as introduced by Ronald Reagan. That our forces with their hair-trigger postures are effectively the same as they have been since the height of the Cold War.

Even if the START 2 treaty were ratified, it is virtually irrelevant, its numbers 3000 to 35000 works meaningless. The former Soviet Union, today Russia, a nation in a perilous state, can barely maintain a third of that number on operational ready status, and to do so devotes a precious fraction of shrinking resources. NATO has been expanded up to its former borders, and Moscow has been put on notice that the United States is presumably prepared to abrogate the ABM treaty in the interest of deploying limited national ballistic missile defense.

What a stunning outcome. I would never have imagined this state of affairs five years ago. This is an indictment. The leaders of the nuclear weapons states today risk very much being judged by future historians as having been unworthy of their age, of not having taken advantage of opportunities so perilously won at such great sacrifice and cost of reigniting nuclear arms races around the world, of condemning mankind to live under a cloud of perpetual anxiety.

This is not a legacy worthy of the human race. This is not the world that I want to bequeath to my children and my grandchildren. It’s simply intolerable. This is above all a moral question and I want to reiterate to you and to those who may be watching these proceedings a quote that I gave yesterday to the joint committees. I took this quote to heart many years ago. It is from one of my heroes, one of my professional heroes – General Omar Bradley, who said on the occasion of his retirement, having been a principal in World War II and having witnessed the aftermath of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: “We live in an age of nuclear giants and ethical infants, in a world that has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. We have solved the mystery of the atom and forgotten the lessons of the Sermon on the Mount. We know more about war than we know about peace, more about dying than we know about living.”

We have a priceless opportunity to elevate, to nudge higher, the bar of decent, civilized behaviour, to expand the rule of law, and to learn to live on this planet with mutual respect and dignity. This is an opportunity we must not lose. My concern was such that I could not sit in silent acquiescence to the current folly.

And so, I have come back into the arena to join my voices with yours, to serve in the company of distinguished colleagues like Bob McNamara and Ambassador Tom Graham who share these concerns and convictions.

Thank you for the opportunity to join you today. Thank you for the work you have done over these many years. It is a privilege to have this opportunity to talk with you. Thank you.

Church Leaders’ Statement

Canadian Church Leaders’ Statement
The leaders of the following churches signed the letter of February 18, 1998 to Prime Minister Chrétien which included these comments:

“The willingness, indeed the intent, to launch a nuclear attack, in certain circumstances, bespeaks spiritual and moral bankruptcy. We believe it to be an extraordinary affront to humanity for nuclear weapons states and their allies, including Canada, to persist in claiming that nuclear weapons are required for their security…. Nuclear weapons have no moral legitimacy, they lack military utility, and, in light of the recent judgement of the World court, their legality is in serious question. The spiritual, human and ecological holocaust of a nuclear attack can be prevented only by the abolition of nuclear weapons it is our common duty to pursue that goal as an urgent priority……

“The time has come for Canada to take a strong, principled stand against the continued possession of nuclear weapons by any state, affirming abolition as the central goal of Canadian nuclear weapons policy and adding Canada’s voice to the call to immediately begin negotiations on a nuclear Weapons Convention.”

Anglican Church in Canada
Armenian Orthodox Church (Canadian diocese)
Baptist Convention of Ontario and Quebec
British Methodist Episcopal Church
Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)
Evangelical Lutheran Church
Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops
Coptic Orthodox Church in Canada
Council of Christian Reformed Churches
Ethiopian Orthodox Church of Canada
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada
Greek Orthodox Metropolis of Canada
Mennonite Central Committee (Canada)
Orthodox Church in America
The Presbyterian Church
The Polish National Catholic Church
Reformed Church in Canada
The Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Canada
The Salvation Army
The United Church of Canada

Statement on Nuclear Weapons by International Civilian Leaders

February 2, 1998

Statement by Alan Cranston

Former U.S. Senator, Chair of the State of the World Forum
February 2, 1998, Washington, D.C. National Press Club

First, I’ll read the statement by heads of state and civilian leaders worldwide, advocating that specific steps be taken now to reduce ongoing nuclear weapon dangers still facing us all after the end of the Cold War.

These leaders, many of whom led their nations during the Cold War, urge that the nuclear states declare unambiguously that their goal is ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons.

The statement is as follows:

Statement on Nuclear Weapons by International Civilian Leaders

The end of the Cold War has wrought a profound transformation of the international political and security arena. Ideological confrontation has been supplanted by burgeoning global relations across every field of human endeavor. There is intense alienation but also civilized discourse. There is acute hostility but also significant effort for peaceful resolution in place of violence and bloodshed.

Most importantly, the long sought prospect of a world free of the apocalyptic threat of nuclear weapons is suddenly within reach. This is an extraordinary moment in the course of human affairs, a near miraculous opportunity to realize that noble goal. But, it is also perishable: the specter of nuclear proliferation cannot be indefinitely contained. The urgent attention and best efforts of scholars and statesmen must be brought to bear.

Leaders of the nuclear weapons states, and of the de facto nuclear nations, must keep the promise of nuclear disarmament enshrined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970 and clarified and reaffirmed in 1995 in the language codifying its indefinite extension. They must do so by commencing the systematic and progressive reduction and marginalization of nuclear weapons, and by declaring unambiguously that their goal is ultimate abolition.

Many military leaders of many nations have warned that all nations would be more secure in a world free of nuclear weapons. Immediate and practical steps toward this objective have been arrayed in a host of compelling studies, most notably in the Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Among these proposals, we, the undersigned, fully subscribe to the following measures:

1. Remove nuclear weapons from alert status, separate them from their delivery vehicles, and place them in secure national storage.

2. Halt production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

3. End nuclear testing, pending entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

4. Launch immediate U.S./Russian negotiations toward further, deep reductions of their nuclear arsenals, irrespective of START II ratification.

5. Unequivocal commitment by the other declared and undeclared nuclear weapon states to join the reduction process on a proportional basis as the U.S. and Russia approach their arsenal levels, within an international system of inspection, verification, and safeguards.

6. Develop a plan for eventual implementation, achievement and enforcement of the distant but final goal of elimination.

The foregoing six steps should be undertaken immediately.

The following additional steps should be carefully considered, to determine whether they are presently appropriate and feasible:

Repatriate nuclear weapons deployed outside of sovereign territory.
Commit to No First Use of nuclear weapons.
Ban production and possession of large, long-range ballistic missiles.
Account for all materials needed to produce nuclear weapons, and place them under
international safeguards.

The world is not condemned to live forever with threats of nuclear conflict, or the anxious, fragile peace imposed by nuclear deterrence. Such threats are intolerable and such a peace unworthy. The sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons invokes a moral imperative for their elimination. That is our mandate. Let us begin.
————————————————-

Argentina
Raul Alfonsin Former President

Australia
Malcom Fraser, Former Prime Minister
Gough Whitlam, Former Prime Minister, Former Foreign Minister
Kim C. Beazley, Leader of the Opposition ,Former Deputy Prime Minister
Richard Butler, Ambassador to U.N. , Chair, U.N. Special Commission on Iraq, Chair, Canberra Commission
Gareth Evans, Former Foreign Minister Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Member, Parliament

Bangladesh
A.D.M.S. Chuwdhury, Deputy Opposition Leader, Parliament, Former Deputy Prime Minister
Muhammad Yunus
Managing Director, Grameen Bank

Brazil
Jose Sarney, Former Prime Minister, Senator
Calso L.N. Amorim, Former Foreign Minister

Bulgaria
Nicolai Dobrev , Chair, National Security Committee, Parliament; Former Minister of Interior
Nicolai Kamov , Chair, Foreign Affairs Committee, Parliament
Dimitra Pavlov, Minister of Defense

Canada
Pierre Trudeau, Former Prime Minister
Douglas Roche
Former Ambassador for Disarmament

Chile
Juan Somavia, Ambassador to U.N.; Past President, UN Security Council

China
Qian Jiadong, Former Chinese Ambassador to U.N.
Chen Jifeng, Secretary General, Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament

Colombia
Misael Pastrana Borrero , Former President
(Deceased Aug. 1997)

Costa Rica
Jose Figueres, President
Oscar Arias, Former President
Rodrigo Carazo , Former President
Rebeca Grynspan Mayufis
Second Vice President
Rodrigo Oreamuno B.
First Vice President

Cyprus
George Vassiliou
Former President
President, United Democrats

Egypt
Esmat Abdul Meguid
Secretary General, League of Arab States
Former Foreign Minister

Finland
Kalevi Sorsa
Former President

France
Michel Rocard
Former Prime Minister
Chair, Committee on Development and Cooperation, European Parliament
Jacques Attali
Former Special Advisor to
President Mitterand

Georgia
Eduard A. Shevardnadze
President

Germany
Helmut Schmidt
Former Chancellor
Honorary Chair, International Council
Hans Modrow
Former Prime Minister, East Germany
Egon Bahr Former Minister for Special Affairs
Angelika Beer
Spokesperson for Defense,
Alliance 90/Green Party
Member, Bundestag
Alfred Dregger
Hon. Chair, Christian Democratic Party
Member, Bundestag
Hans Koschnik, Former Administrator, European Union, Mostar
Markus Meckel, Former Foreign Minister, East Germany; Member, Bundestag
Dr. Walter Romberg, Former Minister of Finances, East Germany
Lothar SpŒth, Former Minister-President, Baden-Wurttemberg
Hans-Jochen Vogel, Former Mayor, Berlin; Former Minister of Justice; Former Chair, Social Democratic Party

Hungary
Ervin Laszlo, Founder and President, Club of Budapest

Israel
Yael Dayan
Member, Kneset

Japan
Tsutomu Hata, Former Prime Minister; Member, Diet
Morihiro Hosokawa, Former Prime Minister; Member, Diet
Kiichi Miyazawa, Former Prime Minister; Member, Diet
Tomiichi Murayama, Former Prime Minister; Member, Diet
Noboru Takeshita, Former Prime Minister; Member, Diet
Takako Doi, Former Speaker, House of Representatives; Member, Diet
Masaharu Gotoda, Former Vice Prime Minister
Takashi Hiraoka, Mayor, Hiroshima
Iccho Ito, Mayor, Nagasaki
Yohei Kono, Former Vice Prime Minister
Hyosuke Kujiraoka Former Vice Speaker, House of Representatives; Member, Diet
Kenzaburo Oe, Nobel Laureate

Kyrgyz Republic
Askar Akaev, President
Muratbek S. Imanaliev,
Foreign Minister
Rosa Otunbaeva
Former Foreign Minister
Ambassador to U.K.

Lebanon
Sadim El.Hoss
Former Prime Minister

Malaysia
Ismail Razali
President, UN General Assembly

Mexico
Miguel de la Madrid
Former President

Mongolia
Punsalmaa Ochirbat
Former President
Jalbuu Choinhor
Ambassador to U.S.

Namibia
Sam Junoma
President

Nauru
Lagumont Harris
Former President
Ruben Kun
Member, Parliament
Former President
David Peter
Former Speaker, Parliament

Netherlands
Ruud Lubbers Former Prime Minister
Minister of State
Andries van Agt
Former Prime Minister
Chair, Interaction Council
E. Korthals Altes
Former Ambassador to Madrid
J. van Houwelingen
Former Deputy Minister of Defence
J.G. Kraaijeveld-Wouters
Former Minister of Defence
Dr. D.J.H. Kruisinga
Former Minister of Defence
Mr. J. de Ruiter
Former Minister of Defence
Prof. Dr. J.C. Terlouw
Former Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Economic Affairs

New Zealand
David Lange
Former Prime Minister
Sir Geoffrey Palmer
Former Prime Minister
North Ireland
Mairead Maguire
Honorary President, Peace People
Nobel Peace Laureate

Pakistan
Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan
Former UN High Commissioner for Refugees
President, Bellerive Foundation
Mahbub ul Haq
President, Human Development Centre
Former Minister of Finance
Principal Architect of UN’s Annual Human Development Report

Panama
Ricardo de la Espriella
Former President

Philippines
Corazon Aquino
Former President

Portugal
Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo
Former Prime Minister

Republic of Korea
Shin Hyon-Hwak
Former Prime Minister

Russia
Egor Gaidar
Former Prime Minister
Director, Research Institute for the Economy in Transition
Mikhail Gorbachev
Former President, S.U.
Georgi Arbatov
President, Governing Board, Institute of USA and Canada
Alexander Bessmertnykh
Former Soviet Foreign Minister
Former Soviet Ambassador to US
President, Foreign Policy Association
Vitaly Goldansky
President, Russian Pugwash Committee
Academician
Roland Timerbaev
Former Permanent Representative of the USSR and Russia in IAEA
President, Center for Political Studies of Russia
Euvgeny Velikhov
Member, National Security Council
Academician
Alexander N. Yakovlev
Chair, President’s Commission on Rehabilitation of Repression Victims
Chair, Russian Public Television;
Former Member, Politburo
Principal Domestic Advisor to President Gorbachev

South Africa
F.W. De Klerk
Former President
Member, Parliament
National Leader, National Party
Bishop Desmond Tutu

Spain
Enrique Baron Crespo
Member, European Parliament
Former President, European Parliament
Former Minister
Fernando Moran Lopez
Chair, Committee on InstitutionalAffairs, European Parliament
Former Foreign Minister

Sri Lanka
A.T. Ariyaratne
Leader, Sarvodaya Movement
Gandhi Peace Prize, 1996
Anura Bandaranaike
Member, Parliament
Former Minister of Education
Former Leader of Opposition
Jayantha Dhanapala
President, NPT Review and Extension Conference, 1995
Former Ambassador to U.S.

Suriname
I.M. Djwalapersad
Speaker, Assembly

Sweden
Goran Persson
Prime Minister
Ingvar Carlsson
Former Prime Minister
Maj Britt Theorin
Former Chair, UN Commission of Experts on Nuclear Weapons
Member, European Parliament

Tanzania
Al Hassan Mwinyi
Former President
Julius K. Nyerere
Former President
Chair, South Commission
Salim Ahmed Salim
Former Prime Minister
Secretary General, Organization of African Unity
President, U.N. General Assembly, 34th Session
Joseph Warioba
Former Prime Minister
Judge, International Tribunal on Law of the Seas

Thailand
Anand Panyarachun
Former Prime Minister
Uganda
Milton Obote
Former President
Dr. Paul Kaeanga Ssemogerere
Former Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister
Dr. Naphali Akena Adoko
Former Chief of State Security
Justice Emmanuel Oteng
Former Acting Chief Justice

United Kingdom
Lord James Callaghan
Former Prime Minister
Member, House of Lords

Lord Denis Healey
Former Secretary of Defense
Former Chancellor of Exchequer
John Edmunds
Former Chief Negotiator, CTBT
Former Head, Arms Control & Disarmament, Foreign Office
Betty Williams
Nobel Peace Laureate

United States
Jimmy Carter
Former President

Zimbabwe
Dr. Robert Mugabe
President

Statement on Nuclear Weapons by International Admirals and Generals

We, military professionals, who have devoted our lives to the national security of our countries and our peoples, are convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever present threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitutes a peril to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect.

Through our variety of responsibilities and experiences with weapons and wars in the armed forces of many nations, we have acquired an intimate and perhaps unique knowledge of the present security and insecurity of our countries and peoples.

We know that nuclear weapons, though never used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, represent a clear and present danger to the very existence of humanity. There was an immense risk of a superpower holocaust during the Cold War. At least once, civilization was on the very brink of catastrophic tragedy. That threat has now receded, but not forever — unless nuclear weapons are eliminated.

The end of the Cold War created conditions favorable to nuclear disarmament. Termination of military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States made it possible to reduce strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and to eliminate intermediate range missiles. It was a significant milestone on the path to nuclear disarmament when Belarus, Kazakhastan, and Ukraine relinquished their nuclear weapons.

Indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the UN General Assembly in 1996 are also important steps towards a nuclear-free world. We commend the work that has been done to achieve these results.

Unfortunately, in spite of these positive steps, true nuclear disarmament has not been achieved. Treaties provide that only delivery systems, not nuclear warheads, will be destroyed. This permits the United States and Russia to keep their warheads in reserve storage, thus creating a “reversible nuclear potential.”

However, in the post-Cold War security environment, the most commonly postulated nuclear threats are not susceptible to deterrence or are simply not credible. We believe, therefore, that business as usual is not an acceptable way for the world to proceed in nuclear matters.

It is our deep conviction that the following is urgently needed and must be undertaken now:

First, present and planned stockpiles of nuclear weapons are exceedingly large and should now be greatly cut back;

Second, remaining nuclear weapons should be gradually and transparently taken off alert, and their readiness substantially reduced both in nuclear weapon states and in de facto nuclear weapon states;

Third, long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia should – without any reduction in their military security – carry forward the reduction process already launched by START: they should cut down to 1000 to 1500 warheads each and possibly lower. The Other three nuclear states and the three threshold states should be drawn into the reduction process as still deeper reductions are negotiated down to the level of hundreds. There is nothing incompatible between defense by individual countries of their territorial integrity and progress toward nuclear abolition.

The exact circumstances and conditions that will make it possible to proceed, finally, to abolition cannot now be foreseen or prescribed. One obvious prerequisite would be a worldwide program of surveillance and inspection, including measures to account for and control inventories of nuclear weapon materials. This will ensure that no rogues or terrorists could undertake a surreptitious effort to acquire nuclear capacities without detection at an early stage An agreed procedure for forcible international intervention and interruption of covert efforts in a certain and timely fashion is essential.

The creation of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world, confidence-building and transparency measures in the general field of defense, strict implementation of all treaties in the area of disarmament and arms control, and mutual assistance in the process of disarmament are also important in helping to bring about a nuclear-free world. The development of regional systems of collective security, including practical measures for cooperation, partnership, interaction and communication are essential for local stability and security.

The extent to which the existence of nuclear weapons and fear of their use may have deterred war – in a world that in this year alone has seen 30 military conflicts raging – cannot be determined. It is clear, however, that nations now possessing nuclear weapons will not relinquish them until they are convinced that more reliable and less dangerous means of providing for their security are in place. It is also clear, as a consequence, that the nuclear powers will not now agree to a fixed timetable for the achievement of abolition.

It is similarly clear that, among the nations not now possessing nuclear weapons, there are some that will not forever forswear their acquisition and deployment unless they, too, are provided means of security. Nor will they forgo acquisition if the present nuclear powers seek to retain everlastingly their nuclear monopoly.

Movement toward abolition must be a responsibility shared primarily by the declared nuclear weapons states – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; by the de facto nuclear states,   India, Israel and Pakistan; and by major non-nuclear powers such as Germany and Japan. All nations should move in concert toward the same goal.

We have been presented with a challenge of the highest possible historic importance: the creation of a nuclear weapons-free world. The end of the Cold War makes it possible.

The dangers of proliferation, terrorism, and a new nuclear arms race render it necessary. We must not fail to seize our opportunity. There is no alternative.

Signed,

INTERNATIONAL GENERALS AND ADMIRALS WHO HAVE SIGNED STATEMENT
ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CANADA
Johnson, Major General Leonard V.. (Ret.) Commandant, National Defence College

DENMARK
Kristensen, Lt. General Gunnar (Ret.) former Chief of Defense Staff

FRANCE
Sanguinetti, Admiral Antoine (Ret.) former Chief of Staff, French Fleet

GHANA
Erskine, General Emmanuel (Ret.) former Commander in Chief and former Chief of Staff UNTSO
(Middle East), Commander UMFII (Lebanon)

GREECE
Capellos, Lt. General Richard (Ret.) former Corps Commander Konstantinides,
Major General Kostas (Ret.), former Chief of Staff, Army Signals
Koumanakos, Lt. General Georgios (Ret.) former Chief of Operations

INDlA
Rikhye, Major General Indar Jit (Ret.), former military advisor to UN Secretary General Dag
Akmmerskjold and U Thant
Surt, Air Marshall N. C. (Ret.)

JAPAN
Sakonjo, Vice Admiral Naotoshi (Ret.) Sr. Advisor, Research Institute for Peace and Security
Shikata Lt. General Toshiyuki (Ret.) Sr. Advisor, Research Institute for Peace and Security

JORDAN
Ajeilat, Major General Shafiq (Ret.) Vice President Military Affairs Muta University
Shiyyab, Major General Mohammed K. (Ret.) former Deputy Commander, Royal Jordanian Air
Force

NETHERLANDS
van der Graaf, Henry J. (Ret.) Brigadier General RNA Director Centre Arms Control &
Verification, Member, United National Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters

NORWAY
Breivik, Roy, Vice Admiral Roy (Ret.) former Representative to NATO, Supreme Allied
Commander, Atlantic

PAKISTAN
Malik Major General Ihsun ul Haq (Ret.) Commandant, Joint Services Committee

PORTUGAL
Gomes, Marshal Francisco da Costa (Ret.) former Commander in Chief, Army; former President
of Portugal

RUSSIA
Belous, General Vladimir (Ret.) Department Chief, Dzerzhmsky Military Academy
Gareev, Army General Makhmut (Ret.) former Deputy Chief, USSR Armed Forces General Staff
Gromov, General Boris, (Ret.) Vice Chair, Duma International Affairs Committee; former
Commander of 40m Soviet Arms in Afghanistan: former Deputy Minister, Foreign Ministry, Russia
Koltounov, Major General Victor (Ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff,
USSR Armed Forces
Larionov, Major General Valentin (Ret.) Professor, General Staff Academy
Lebed, Major General Alexander (Ret.) former Secretary of the Security Council
Lebedev, Major General Youri V. (Ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff,
USSR Armed Forces
Makarevsky, Major General Vadim (Ret.) Deputy Chief, Kouibyshev Military Engineering
Academy
Medvedev, Lt. General Vlad~rmr (Ret.) Chief. Center of Nuclear Threat Reduction
Mikhailov, Colonel General Georg~· (Ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff,
USSR Armed Forces
Nozhin Major General Eugenq (Ret.) former Deputy Chief Department of General Staff, USSR
Armed Forces
Rokhlin Lt. General Lev (Ret.) Chair, Duma Defense Committee; former Commander, Russian 4th
Army Corps
Sleport, Lt. General Ivan (Ret.) former Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Simonyan, Major General Rair (Ret.) Head of Chair, General Staff Academy
Surikov, General Boris T., (Ret.) former Chief Specialist, Defense Ministry
Tehervov, Colonel General Nikolay (Ret.) former Chief, Department of General Staff USSR
Armed Forces
Vinogradov, Lt. General Michael S. (Ret.) former Deputy Chief, Operational Strategic Center,
USSR General Staff
Zoubkov, Rear Admiral Radiy (Ret.) Chief, Navigation, USSR Navy

SRI LANKA
Karunaratne, Major General Upali A. (Ret.) (Sri Lanka)
Silva, Major General C.A.M.N., (Ret.) USF, U.S.A. WC (Sri Lanka)

TANZANlA
Lupogo, Major General H. C. (Ret.) former Chief Inspector General, Tanzania Armed Forces

UNITED KINGDOM
Beach, General Sir Hugh (Ret.) Member, U. K. Security Commission
Carver, Field Marshal Lord Michael (Ret.) Commander in Chief for East British Army
(1967-1969), Chief of General Staff (1971-73) Chief of Defence Staff (1973-76)
Harbottle, Brigadier Michael (Ret.) former Chief of Staff, UN Peacekeeping Force, Cyprus
Mackie, Air Commodore Alistair (Ret.) former Director Air Staff Briefing

UNITED STATES
Becton, Lt. General Julius (USA) (Ret.)
Bums, Maj. General William F. (USA) (Ret.) JCS Representative, INF Negotiations (1981-88)
Special Envoy to Russia for Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement (1992-93)
Carroll, Jr., Rear Admiral Eugene J. (USN) (Ret.) Deputy Director, Center for Defense
Information
Cushman, Lt. General John H. (USA) (Ret.) Commander, I. Corps (ROK/US) Group (Korea)
1976-78)
Galvin, General John R., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (1987-92)
Gavler, Admiral Noel (USN) (Ret.) former Commander, Pacific
Homer, General Charles A. (USAF) (Ret.) Commander, Coalition Air Forces, Desert Storm
(1991); former Commander U. S. Space Command
James, Rear Admiral Robert G. (USNR) (Ret.)
Kingston, General Robert C. (USA) (Ret.) former Commander. U.S. Central Command
Lee, Vice Admiral John M. (USN) (Ret.)
Odom, Gen. William E. (USA)(Ret.) Director, National Security Studies, Hudson Institute; Deputy
Assistant and Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (1981-85); Director, National Security
Agency (1985-88)
O’Meara, General Andrew (USA) (Ret.) former Commander U.S. Army, Europe
Pursley, Lt. General Robert E., USAF (Ret.)
Read, Vice Admiral William L. (USN) (Ret.), former Commander, U.S. Navy Surface Force,
Atlantic Command
Rogers, General Bemard W. (USA) (Ret.), former Chief of Staff, U.S, Army, former NATO
Supreme Allied Commander(1979-87)
Seignious, II, Lt. General George M. (USA) (Ret.), former Director Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (1978-1980)
Shanahan, Vice Admiral John J. (USN) (Ret.) Director, Center for Defense Information
Smith, General William Y., (USAF) (Ret.) former Deputy Commander, U.S. Command Europe
Wilson, Vice Admiral James B (CSN) (Ret.), former Polaris Submarine Captain.